The transmission of monetary policy through the interest rate mechanism has been thoroughly discussed in economic literature for quite some time. The traditional view is that, the change in real interest rate influences the cost of capital. The change in cost of capital affects the magnitude of investment and consumption and therefore the level of, real income and prices [Mishkin (1995)].1 Operationally the State bank of Pakistan, influences the yield on treasury bills (T-bills). This is done on the assumption that the yield on treasury bills influences other interest rates like the Money Market rate (Call money rate), banks’ deposit and banks’ Lending rates. The change in these rates influences the cost of capital and thus level of investment and consumption in the economy. Given this, the central bank can influence the yield on T-bills to influence the level of real income and the level of prices. The foregoing explanation of the monetary transmission mechanism makes it clear that if the changes in yield on the T-Bill rate are not passed on to the Call money rate and the bank deposit and the Lending rate then it becomes difficult for the central bank to use the channels that involve interest rate, for influencing the level of output and prices. Hence it is important to test whether the changes in the treasury bill rate are passed on to money market rate, bank deposit rate and the bank lending rate and if yes at what speed and to what extent. Therefore this study examines the pass-through of the changes in Treasury bill rate to Call Money rate, Banks’ deposit rate and Banks’ Lending rate.

Purpose This study aims to comparatively analyze the systematic, idiosyncratic and downside risk exposure of both Islamic and conventional funds in Pakistan to see which of the funds has higher risk exposure. Design/methodology/approach The study analyzes different types of risks involved in both Islamic and conventional funds for the period from 2009 to 2016 by using different risk measures. For systematic and idiosyncratic risk single factor CAPM and multifactor models such as Fama French three factors model and Carhart four factors model are used. For downside risk analysis different measures such as downside beta, relative beta, value at risk and expected short fall are used. Findings The study finds that Islamic funds have lower risk exposure (including total, systematic, idiosyncratic and downside risk) compared with their conventional counterparts in most of the sample years, and hence, making them appear more attractive for investment especially for Sharīʿah-compliant investors preferring low risk preferences. Practical implications As this study shows, Islamic mutual funds exhibit lower risk exposure than their conventional counterparts so investors with lower risk preferences can invest in these kinds of funds. In this way, this research provides the input to the individual investors (especially Sharīʿah-compliant investors who want to avoid interest based investment) to help them with their investment decisions as they can make a more diversified portfolio by considering Islamic funds as a mean for reducing the risk exposure. Originality/value To the best of the author’s knowledge, this study is the first attempt at world level in looking at the comparative risk analysis of various types of the risks as follows: systematic, idiosyncratic and downside risk, for both Islamic and conventional funds, and thus, provides significant contribution in the literature of mutual funds.

The 7th National Finance Commission (NFC) Award has seemingly put an end to the deadlock over revenue distribution among the constituents of the federation in Pakistan. This paper argues that though the 7th NFC Award’s use of multiple indicator criteria for the distribution of resources is a step forward in the right direction, the distribution design still falls short on various counts. For example, the weight of 82 percent for the population share is on the higher side whereas the demographic structure of the population, an important indicator of the expenditure needs, does not figure up in the distribution design. Also, the basis of weights assigned to the four elements of the revenue distribution criteria is unknown and no rigorous exercise seems to have been undertaken to determine these weights. Similarly, matching grants, which are a key element of the distribution design elsewhere, are altogether absent in Pakistan. Furthermore, provinces still rely on large transfers from the centre which undermines the incentives of the provinces to generate their own revenues. The paper emphasises that there is a need to rethink the mechanisms for resource sharing as well as the institutional structure of the NFC itself. JEL Classification: H77 Keywords: Intergovernmental Transfers

This study develops a theoretical a model to examine the impact of predation on aggregate output and aggregate consumption. Using game theoretic framework we show that predation, reduces aggregate output and per capita consumption. Predation occurs when some agents enjoy comparative advantage in predation. Given predation under comparative advantage of some agents, a larger part of the aggregate output accrues to the predators. We also demonstrate that given inequality of endowments, the poorly endowed enjoys an incentive to predate. The payoff of the well endowed from production and predation is the same. Therefore the well endowed has no incentive to predate. If the well endowed still predates this would be owed to his comparative advantage in predation rather than the inequality per se. Large endowments are only one of the numerous sources that afford such comparative advantage. Good institutions like rule of law and effective government tame this comparative advantage. It is due to this kind of taming, that despite significant inequality in some economies, the level of predation observed is relatively low. Institutional quality thus determines the level of predation. We also show that redistribution from well endowed to poorly endowed will not only increase per capita consumption but will also be a ‗Pareto improvement‘. JEL classification: D03, O43, P14 Keywords: Predation, Institutions, Growth

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