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Abstract:We report that on any given day the number of inmates released from incarceration significantly affects the number of offenses committed this day, and we name this as first-day recidivism. Our estimates of this novel approach to study early recidivism are robust to a variety of alternative model specifications. We then show that first-day recidivism can be eliminated by an increase in the gratuity provided to prisoners at the time of their release. A simple cost-benefit analysis shows that increasing the gratuity at release is a very efficient policy.

We study the effects of police monitoring on crime. We exploit detailed information on the location and date of installation of police-monitored surveillance cameras, coupled with data at the street-segment level on all reported crimes in the city of Montevideo, Uruguay. We find that the introduction of police-monitored surveillance cameras reduces crime by about 20 percent in monitored areas relative to a pure control group located outside the city. We also explore potential displacement effects, and we do not find evidence of such effects.

work is licensed under a Creative Commons IGO 3.0 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives (CC-IGO BY-NC-ND 3.0 IGO) license (http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/igo/legalcode) and may be reproduced with attribution to the IDB and for any noncommercial purpose, as provided below. No derivative work is allowed.Any dispute related to the use of the works of the IDB that cannot be settled amicably shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules. The use of the IDB's name for any purpose other than for attribution, and the use of IDB's logo shall be subject to a separate written license agreement between the IDB and the user and is not authorized as part of this CC-IGO license.Following a peer review process, and with previous written consent by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), a revised version of this work may also be reproduced in any academic journal, including those indexed by the American Economic Association's EconLit, provided that the IDB is credited and that the author(s) receive no income from the publication. Therefore, the restriction to receive income from such publication shall only extend to the publication's author(s). With regard to such restriction, in case of any inconsistency between the Creative Commons IGO 3.0 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives license and these statements, the latter shall prevail.Note that link provided above includes additional terms and conditions of the license.The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent.http://www.iadb.org 2015 Abstract * In this paper, we bring to light the experiences resulting from the significant depreciation of the Uruguayan real exchange rate between 2002 and 2003, followed by an equally considerable appreciation between 2004 and 2010. We explore the link between these fluctuations and the incidence of domestic violence taking place in Uruguay. The real exchange rate is a measure of the relative price between tradable and nontradable goods. While men are traditionally employed in tradable industries, such as manufacturing, women are more likely to work in nontradable industries, such as the service sector. A change in the real exchange rate, therefore, can affect the potential wages of men differently from those of women. In line with the models that represent household bargaining, an increase in the real exchange rate can generate an increase in the bargaining power of men relative to that of women within the household. We present evidence that it raises the frequency of domestic violence. This holds true in rich and poor areas of the city.JEL Code: K42