International audienceIntersecting the boundaries of public and private economic activity, public-private ties carry important organizational strategy, management, and policy implications. We identify the value creation and capture mechanisms embedded in these ties through a theoretical framework of two conceptual public-private structural alternatives, each associated with different value-creating capacities, rationales, and outcomes. Two important restraints on private value capture--public partner opportunism and external stakeholder activism--arise asymmetrically under each form, carrying a critical effect on partnership outcomes

Focusing on the collaboration intersecting public, non-profit and private spheres of economic activity, we analyse the conceptual forms of hybridity embedded in these novel interorganizational arrangements, and link them to different mechanisms of creating social value. We first disentangle alternative notions of hybrid arrangements in existing literature by proposing a conceptual typology on two theoretically complementary yet distinct dimensions: hybridity in governance and hybridity in organizational logics. We show how both forms of hybridity can jointly occur in complex public-private and cross-sector collaborations, and propose the notion of value as a crucial bridging point between these perspectives. Crucially, we develop a conceptual framework on key theoretical mechanisms leading to economic and social value in these interorganizational collaborations. Our work deepens the understanding of how diverse, hybrid forms of collaboration can create value and builds critical links between previously disparate streams of literature on public-private interaction, cross-sector collaboration and social enterprises.

International audienceExisting research provides contradictory insights on the effect of public sponsorship on the market performance of organizations. We develop the nascent theory on sponsorship by highlighting the dual and contingent nature of the relationship between public sponsorship and market performance. By arguing that sponsorship differentially affects resource accumulation and allocation mechanisms, we suggest two opposing firm-level effects, leading to an inverted U-shaped relationship between the amount of public sponsorship received and the market performance of sponsored organizations. This non-linear relationship, we argue, is moderated by the breadth, depth and focus of the focal organization's resource accumulation and allocation patterns. While horizontal scope (i.e. increased breadth) and externally oriented resource profile (i.e. reduced depth) strengthen the relationship, market orientation (i.e. increased focus) attenuates it. We test and find strong support for our hypotheses using population data on French film production firms from 1998 to 2008. Our work highlights the performance trade-offs associated with public sponsorship, and carries important managerial and policy implications

There has been a growing interest in the organization of business activities at the public interface as illustrated by the emergent phenomenon of public–private partnerships (PPPs). In this study, we analyze the determinants of private scope in partnering with public actors—that is, the extent to which private actors are involved in multiple, consecutive value-creating activities in the partnership. Based on a unique data set of public–private agreements worldwide over two decades, we find that institutional and capability-based determinants jointly affect the extent of private scope in public–private collaborations. Our results highlight the contingent role of the quality of the institutional environment. Institutions not only facilitate greater private scope directly but also, moderate the effect of public and private capabilities on private scope. We find that prior public experience in PPPs enhances private scope in settings with high-quality institutions while having an opposing effect in low-quality environments. Moreover, public governance capabilities accumulated via units designed to deal with PPPs seem to substitute for the lack of high-quality institutions, suggesting that, even under weak institutional settings, countries can foster high private scope with the creation of pockets of specialized public capabilities. In contrast, private capabilities in PPPs, expressed as firm engagement in recurring government cofunded projects, seem to have a complementary effect: they help to increase private scope in PPPs but only when domestic institutions are of high quality. By highlighting the determinants of private actor involvement in public sector activities, our study offers important implications for the theory and practice of hybrid (cross-sector) organizational forms. The e-companion is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2018.1251 .