<p class="Default">The purpose of this paper is to analyze the moderating effect of corporate governance and ownership features in lessening earnings management practices in a free cash flow (FCF) situation. A simultaneous equations model is developed to address endogeneity of the FCF variable. Based on a sample of French companies belonging to the SBF 120 index from 2001 to 2010, the results highlight the opportunistic behavior of managers in presence of free cash flows. Particularly, managers engage in earnings management practices that increase reported earnings. Our results also show that corporate governance mechanisms such as audit committee independence and external audit quality, in addition to institutional investors and managerial ownership reduce the extent of earnings management. Corporate governance mechanisms are substitutive in their monitoring role of managers’ behavior to reduce earnings management in presence of a free cash flow problem. </p>

Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of the relationship between shareholder activism and earnings management on the market performance of French companies. Design/methodology/approach This study used 385 firm-year observations drawn from a sample of French companies belonging to the SBF 120 index from 2008 to 2012. Data was collected from annual reports of sample companies. To measure earnings management, this study used the model of Raman and Shahrur (2008). The relationship between shareholder activism, earnings management and market performance using the panel data regression model was empirically examined. Findings The results prove that shareholder activism, as indicated by shareholder proposals, has no impact on market performance. However, the existence of shareholder activism affects the market performance positively. In fact, a minimum of proposals proves that shareholder activism plays an appropriate and effective role in creating value. Thus, several activists would resort to “a private activism” which could be the best and the least expensive form. This form of activism is called “behind the scenes.” Findings also show that earnings management has a negative impact on market performance. As a matter of fact, these findings allow to conclude that the firm performance decreases whenever managers undertake to earnings management. Also, earnings management behavior is mainly opportunistic. Finally, the relationship between shareholder activism and earnings management has no impact on market performance. This result reveals that shareholder activism proves to be an ineffective mechanism that does not alter the accounting choices, particularly in relation to earnings management. This result shows the inability of active shareholders to define and implement strategies across their proposals, namely, “the lack of monitoring competence.” Research limitations/implications It is important in future research to evaluate the impact of behind the scenes interventions on corporate governance. Also, this paper gives a larger dimension to the effect of shareholder activism on the market performance in the specific context of earnings management, thus justifying the need to expand this study using other methodologies to deepen and better understand this relationship in this context. Practical implications The paper's evidence contributes to an understanding of corporate governance. The finding of this study will help in monitoring and controlling fraudulent earnings management practices that effect on market performance. Further, this study is important to investors, academics and policymakers, as it demonstrates that governance reforms that encourage firms to adopt better governance practices that reduce the likelihood of earnings management. Originality/value To the best of the author’s knowledge, this paper pioneers in focusing on the impact of the shareholder activism and earnings management on the market performance because previous studies put more emphasis on pair-wise relations (Shareholder activism-earnings management, earnings management-market performance and shareholder activism-market performance). This study provides empirical evidence on the effectiveness of the relationship between shareholder activism and earnings management on market performance.

The highest beta-mannanase activity was produced by Penicillium occitanis Pol6 on flour of carob seed, whereas starch-containing medium gave lower enzymes titles. The low molecular weight enzyme was purified to homogeneity by ammonium sulfate precipitation, gel filtration, and ion-exchange chromatography procedures. The purified beta-mannanase (ManIII) has been identified as a glycoprotein (carbohydrate content 5%) with an apparent molecular mass of 18 kDa. It was active at 40 degrees C and pH 4.0. It was stable for 30 min at 70 degrees C and has a broad pH stability (2.0-12.0). ManIII showed K (m), V (max), and K (cat) values of 17.94 mg/ml, 93.52 U/mg, and 28.13 s(-1) with locust bean gum as substrate, respectively. It was inhibited by mannose with a K (I) of 0.610(-3) mg/ml. ManIII was activated by CuSO4 and CaCl2 (2.5 mM). However, in presence of 2.5 mM Co2+, its activity dropped to 60% of the initial activity. Both N-terminal and internal amino acid sequences of ManIII presented no homology with mannanases of glycosides hydrolases. During incubation with locust bean gum and Ivory nut mannan, the enzyme released mainly mannotetraose, mannotriose, and mannobiose.

On the basis of its potent insecticidal activity and its high level of δ-endotoxin production, the BUPM28 isolate can be considered to be an effective alternative for the control of S. littoralis.