We demonstrate that personal political preferences of corporate managers influence corporate policies. Specifically, Republican managers who are likely to have conservative personal ideologies adopt and maintain more conservative corporate policies. Those firms have lower levels of corporate debt, lower capital and research and development (R&D) expenditures, less risky investments, but higher profitability. Using the 9/11 terrorist attacks and Sept. 2008 Lehman Brothers bankruptcy as natural experiments, we demonstrate that investment policies of Republican managers became more conservative following these exogenous uncertainty-increasing events. Furthermore, around chief executive officer (CEO) turnovers, including CEO deaths, firm leverage policy becomes more conservative when managerial conservatism increases.

We demonstrate that personal political preferences of corporate managers influence corporate policies. Specifically, Republican managers who are likely to have conservative personal ideologies adopt and maintain more conservative corporate policies. Those firms have lower levels of corporate debt, lower capital and research and development (R&D) expenditures, less risky investments, but higher profitability. Using the 9/11 terrorist attacks and Sept. 2008 Lehman Brothers bankruptcy as natural experiments, we demonstrate that investment policies of Republican managers became more conservative following these exogenous uncertainty-increasing events. Furthermore, around chief executive officer (CEO) turnovers, including CEO deaths, firm leverage policy becomes more conservative when managerial conservatism increases.

Using one of the largest samples of litigation data available to date, we examine whether the political culture of a firm determines its propensity for corporate misconduct. We measure political culture using the political contributions of top managers, firm political action committees, and local residents. We show that firms with a Republican culture are more likely to be the subject of civil rights, labor, and environmental litigation than are Democratic firms, consistent with the Democratic ideology that emphasizes equal rights, labor rights, and environmental protection. However, firms with a Democratic culture are more likely to be the subject of litigation related to securities fraud and intellectual property rights violations than are Republican firms, whose party ideology stresses self-reliance, property rights, market discipline, and limited government regulation. Upon litigation filing, both types of firms experience similar announcement reaction, which suggests that the observed relationship between political culture and corporate misconduct is unlikely to reflect differences in expected litigation costs. Data, as supplemental material, are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2106 . This paper was accepted by Brad Barber, finance.

In this paper, we find support for initial public offerings (IPOs) motivated by subsequent acquisition activity. Over a third of newly public firms enter the market for corporate control as acquirers within three years of the IPO. We find that IPOs facilitate acquisitions in a number of ways. Newly public firms benefit from the cash raised in the IPO, from subsequent access to public financing, and from ability to pay with publicly traded stock for acquisitions. IPO firms also benefit by obtaining market feedback and by taking advantage of high post‐IPO stock values in making stock‐based acquisitions at favorable terms.

Higher first-year post-issue returns are associated with a significantly higher probability of follow-on equity issuance over the next 5 years. This result holds when we control for pre-issue returns and other factors known to affect the probability of equity issuance. The result is most consistent with the market feedback hypothesis that a high post-issue return encourages managers to increase the firm’s investment because it implies that, in the market’s view, the marginal return to the project is high.