The present article reviews evidence for the malleability of automatic stereotypes and prejudice. In contrast to assumptions that such responses are fixed and inescapable, it is shown that automatic stereotypes and prejudice are influenced by, (a) self-and social motives, (b) specific strategies, (c) the perceiver's focus of attention, and (d) the configuration of stimulus cues. In addition, group members' individual characteristics are shown to influence the extent to which (global) stereotypes and prejudice are automatically activated. This evidence has significant implications for conceptions of automaticity, models of stereotyping and prejudice, and attitude representation. The review concludes with the description of an initial model of early social information processing.

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The experiments in this article were conducted to observe the automatic activation of gender stereotypes and to assess theoretically specified conditions under which such stereotype priming may be moderated. Across 4 experiments, 3 patterns of data were observed: (a) evidence of stereotype priming under baseline conditions of intention and high cognitive constraints, (b) significant reduction of stereotype priming when a counterstereotype intention was formed even though cognitive constraints were high, and (c) complete reversal of stereotype priming when a counterstereotype intention was formed and cognitive constraints were low. These data support proposals that stereotypes may be automatically activated as well as proposals that perceivers can control and even eliminate such effects.

Research on implicit stereotypes has raised important questions about an individual's ability to moderate and control stereotypic responses. With few strategies shown to be effective in moderating implicit effects, the present research investigates a new strategy based on focused mental imagery. Across 5 experiments, participants who engaged in counterstereotypic mental imagery produced substantially weaker implicit stereotypes compared with participants who engaged in neutral, stereotypic, or no mental imagery. This reduction was demonstrated with a variety of measures, eliminating explanations based on response suppression or shifts in response criterion. Instead, the results suggest that implicit stereotypes are malleable, and that controlled processes, such as mental imagery, may influence the stereotyping process at its early as well as later stages.

Prior research has shown that within a racial category, people with more Afrocentric facial features are presumed more likely to have traits that are stereotypic of Black Americans compared with people with less Afrocentric features. The present study investigated whether this form of feature-based stereotyping might be observed in criminal-sentencing decisions. Analysis of a random sample of inmate records showed that Black and White inmates, given equivalent criminal histories, received roughly equivalent sentences. However, within each race, inmates with more Afrocentric features received harsher sentences than those with less Afrocentric features. These results are consistent with laboratory findings, and they suggest that although racial stereotyping as a function of racial category has been successfully removed from sentencing decisions, racial stereotyping based on the facial features of the offender is a form of bias that is largely overlooked.