How does religion affect one's attitudes toward immigrants? Scholars have shown that members of minor religious groups are less anti-immigrant than members of majority affiliations and that Evangelical Protestants are particularly hostile. Other scholars have demonstrated that increased religiosity reduces immigrant animus. Here, we argue that religion affects immigration attitudes via a distinct religiously informed interpretation of America's national identity, which we call Christian nationalism. Christian nationalists believe that America has a divinely inspired mission and link its success to God's favor. Using social identity complexity theory, we argue that citizens who ascribe to this worldview should be least tolerant of those they perceive as symbolic threats to American national identity. We assess this claim using the 2006 Pew Immigration Attitudes Survey and the 2008 Cooperative Congressional Election Survey. Christian nationalism is a robust determinant of immigrant animus, whereas religious affiliation only affects immigrant animus when Christian nationalism is excluded.

Sanctions rarely work but they continue to be used frequently by policymakers. I argue that previous studies of sanctions ignore the problem of strategic censoring by focusing only on cases of observed sanctions. In this paper, I develop a unified model of sanction imposition and success and test it using a simultaneous equation censored probit model. This selection-corrected sanction model finds that the process by which sanctions are imposed is linked to the process by which some succeed while others fail, and that the unmeasured factors that lead to sanction imposition are negatively related to their success.

A central component of International Monetary Fund~IMF! programs is reducing government budget deficits+ We ask how domestic political considerations shape the distribution of cuts made by governments in IMF programs+ Our central finding is that IMF programs shrink the role played by domestic politics+ While democracies allocate larger shares of their budgets to public services in the absence of IMF programs, the difference between democracies and nondemocracies disappears under IMF programs+ This result has important implications for our understanding of government spending priorities under different resource constraints+ We dedicate this article to the memory of Harold K+ Jacobson+ Robert Kaufman, Lisa Martin, Joan Nelson, and two anonymous reviewers for IO provided valuable comments on earlier drafts, and Chris

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We extend the literature on openness and spending in developing countries arguing that the effect of increasing openness depends on both regime type and the level of openness. Democracies respond to increases in openness by increasing spending while dictatorships respond by decreasing spending. However, the degree to which countries pursue the strategy of choice depends on the level of openness. In autarkic countries, an increase in import competition has more severe consequences for perceptions of job insecurity and dislocation. In response, government management of openness will be more vigorous under these conditions regardless of whether the leader increases or decreases spending. Economic selection mechanisms at work will produce an outcome wherein, at higher levels of openness, further import liberalization has smaller effects on perceptions of job insecurity and dislocation. Hence, both the demand and the supply of government management of openness will be lower.