Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe analyze how consumer preferences for one-stop shopping a¤ect the (Nash) bargaining relationships between a retailer and its suppliers. One-stop shopping preferences create 'demand complementarities'among otherwise independent products which lead to two opposing e¤ects on upstream merger incentives: …rst a standard double mark-up problem and second a bargaining e¤ect. The former creates merger incentives while the later induces suppliers to bargain separately. When buyer power becomes large enough, then suppliers stay separated which raises …nal good prices. We also show that our result can be obtained when wholesale prices are determined in a non-cooperative game, under two-part tari¤s and when products are substitutable. JEL-Classi…cation: L12, L22, L42

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe analyze …rms'location choices in a Hotelling model with two-dimensional consumer heterogeneity, along addresses and transport cost parameters ( ‡exibility). Firms can price discriminate based on perfect data on consumer addresses and (possibly) imperfect data on consumer ‡exibility. We show that …rms'location choices depend on how strongly consumers di¤er in ‡exibility. Precisely, when consumers are relatively homogeneous, equilibrium locations are socially optimal regardless of the quality of customer ‡exibility data. However, when consumers are relatively di¤erentiated, …rms make socially optimal location choices only when customer ‡exibility data is perfect. These results are driven by the optimal strategy of a …rm on its turf, monopolization or market-sharing, which in turn depends on consumer heterogeneity in ‡exibility. Our analysis is motivated by the availability of customer data, which allows …rms to practice third-degree price discrimination based on both consumer characteristics relevant in spatial competition, addresses and transport cost parameters.JEL-Classi…cation: D43; L13; R30; R32.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the authors' own opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of the editor. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe re-examine the common wisdom that cross-border mergers are the most e¤ective merger strategy for …rms facing powerful unions. In contrast, we obtain a domestic merger outcome whenever …rms are su¢ ciently heterogeneous (in terms of productive e¢ ciency and product di¤erentiation). A domestic merger unfolds a "wage-unifying"e¤ect which limits the union's ability to extract rents. When asymmetries among …rms vanish, then cross-border mergers are the unique equilibrium. However, they may be either between symmetric or asymmetric …rms. Social welfare is never higher under a domestic merger outcome than under a crossborder merger outcome. JEL-Classi…cation: D43, J51, L13.

We take today's mobile marketing data landscape as a starting point and consider a duopoly model of third-degree price discrimination in which firms can complement geo-location information with data on consumer flexibility of varying quality. We show that, depending on consumer heterogeneity, higher-quality flexibility

We analyze competing firms’ incentives to adopt a technology that allows making refined targeted offers to returning customers. Consumer foresight is crucial for firms’ decisions. Although our setup is symmetric, when consumers are myopic, the unique equilibrium is asymmetric in firms’ technology adoption decisions. Contrary to conventional wisdom, consumers may be better off being myopic than sophisticated. Light privacy policy may benefit consumers if it reduces the costs of handling customer data and avoids strict obligations on firms to inform consumers about data use, which would erode investment incentives into targeting technology.