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Russia enters 2017 in a paradoxical situation. The Kremlin is open and ready for strategic negotiations on the entire spectrum of world issues. It is free from any internal political constraints that would impede upon its foreign policy and is thus in a position to act effectively. Yet Russia finds itself alone at the negotiating table. Russia's partners are busy with either elections (the US in November 2016, France and Germany in 2017) or critical institutional issues (the European Union) and are therefore not prepared to negotiate or, more importantly, to resolve strategic global issues. However, the three key issues-Syria, terrorism, and Ukrainewill determine the general agenda and, indeed, the very possibility of further negotiations between Russia and the West. The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation), which have provided alternative formats, and have been the backbone of Russia's political narrative in recent years, are faltering. The political crisis in Brazil and a general rightward political shift in Latin America stymie any talk of an intensified development of relations with the countries of the region as a pre-emptive counterweight to deteriorating relations with the West. In 2017, these trends will continue to develop. The lack of strategic goal-setting by Western partners hinders the shaping and implementation of the Kremlin's foreign policy, thereby forcing it to continue feeling its way, looking for instruments to maintain the fragile balance and dialogue. This has resulted in actions ranging from the heavy-handed (e.g. in early October President Putin signed a decree suspending the plutonium utilisation agreement with the 85

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This forecast examines the major trends in Russia's relations with the world and in the Russian view of the world in 2016. The forecast looks firstly at Russia's role in the world in the context of the extant and emergent state of geopolitics. In a confused international environment, caught between the multiple, discordant and disorderly games of checkers of the present and the emerging design of a new grand chessboard for international relations, Russia and the West have been forced into cooperation. While far from easy and far from guaranteed to work – or last – this situation does offer the possibility of overcoming divides to pursue mutual interests. These interests become particularly apparent in the context of increased shared threats and the need to act jointly against them, the uncertainties created by rising powers, and the difficulties that Russia finds itself in. The key role of new mega-regional trade agreements in this emerging great game is also emphasised in the subsequent sections of the forecast, which deal, respectively, with foreign policy and political economy. The foreign policy analysis sees the US in flux in a presidential election year, and the EU caught at the crossroads of its own failure to capitalise on integration and a migration crisis of unprecedented proportions. Meanwhile, foreign policy in the post-Soviet space is characterised more by stasis than by substantial change, with frozen conflicts and stagnant reforms in Ukraine and limited room for manoeuvre for other players the order of the day. The Russian involvement in the Middle East, however, is anything but stagnant, with the military operations in Syria having dramatic effects in both the situation in Syria and global and regional geopolitics. The sustainability of this quest for influence, however, is questioned by the attitude of other players, but also by Russia's own internal weaknesses, notably its serious and deepening economic crisis.

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