Russia's current policy toward Ukraine is an example of regionalization and re‐territorialization based on purely (geo)political reasons. The Kremlin uses different ‘markers’ and tools to reshape Ukrainian regional identity. The main purpose of this article is to reveal the role of the media in creating and sharing the Kremlin's narratives as a tool for the legitimization of its war on Ukraine and the manipulation of citizens' minds in both countries. This paper is based on the regional studies and discourse analysis methodology that enables a development from the meta‐level to the level of discursive practices in which Russian officials' rhetoric is changing the regional identity of neighboring countries. This paper thus starts by arguing whether there is a place for critical thinking in Russian mass media. It then identifies and describes key narratives from the Kremlin as represented in Russian media on the ‘special operation’ in Ukraine in 2022. The conclusions are grounded on a discursive analysis of articles from major quality nationwide daily Russian newspapers and online news portals (Moscow Times, Kommersant, Izvestiya, and Rossiyskaya Gazeta). The article concludes that Russian officials' rhetoric as widely spread by Russian media should be perceived as a tool used consciously by the Kremlin to reformat both Russian and Ukrainian regional identity. A shift from ‘Ukraine loses the war’ to ‘Russia is at war with the West’ to save Ukrainians and to protect Russia, its identity, and even its civilization, and the introduction of a special glossary can be used for a re‐territorialization that enables the existing geopolitical space to be changed.

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This article explores escalation as a tool which is being used in Russian military strategy in the twenty-first century. This method of operation has been transformed from a purely defensive deterrence asset which was valid at the beginning of the 2000s into an element of aggressive deterrence, one which bases itself on Russia presenting Crimea’s annexation as a fait accompli. The authors conclude that the strategic value for Moscow of the Black Sea region has grown with the annexation of Crimea, so that it now surpasses the value of the Baltic region. This can be inferred by comparing the Russian military potential which is present in both regions, as well as through related doctrines and corresponding decisions. To a major extent, the Russian stance in the Baltic plays a coercive role in its strategy: it aims to boost deterrence on the Black Sea, where Moscow sees itself as being more vulnerable.