Purpose This paper aims to analyse the relationship between ownership structure and financial performance in the five major European football leagues from 2007-2008 to 2012-2013 and examine the impact of the financial fair play (FFP) regulation. Design/methodology/approach The sample used comprises 94 teams that participated in the major European competitions: German Bundesliga, Ligue 1 of France, Spanish Liga, English Premier League and the Italian Serie A. The estimation technique used is panel-corrected standard errors. Findings The results confirm an inverted U-shaped curve relationship between ownership structure and financial performance as a consequence of both monitoring and expropriation effects. Moreover, the results show that after FFP regulation, the monitoring effect disappears and only the expropriation effect remains. Research limitations/implications The lack of transparency of the information provided by some teams has limited the sample size. Practical implications One of the main issues that the various regulating bodies of the industry should address is the introduction of a code of good practice, not only for aspects related to the transparency of financial information but also to require greater transparency in the information concerning corporate governance. Social implications Regulating bodies could also consider other additional control instruments based on corporate governance, such as for example, corporate governance practices, corporate governance codes, greater transparency, control of the boards of directors, etc. Originality/value This study tries to provide direct evidence of the impact of large majority investors in the clubs and FFP regulation on the financial performance of football clubs.

This article analyses the relevance of the agency problems that exist between shareholders and managers (type I agency problems) and between majority and minority shareholders (type II agency problems), in determining the composition of the board of directors, differentiating between family owned and non-family owned firms. The hypotheses are tested on a sample of 173 Spanish listed companies for the period 2004-2011. The results of our study indicate that, on one hand, as type I agency problems increase, firms increase their percentage of outside directors and, on the other, as type II agency problems increase, firms increase the ratio of independent to nominee directors. Whether the company is a family firm or not does moderate the influence of insider ownership over the composition of the board. Generally speaking, our findings support the view that firms configure their board of directors in such a way as to best signal to the market both efficient management and a balance of the interests of all shareholders. Likewise, these results could be taken into account when formulating recommendations on the composition of the board of directors.

In the current scenario of increasing social inequality, the debate over the compensation received by directors and executives of large listed companies, and its justification, has intensified. Drawing on Agency Theory and Human Capital Theory, a multilevel analytical technique is used in this paper to examine the influence of firm-level variables and director-level variables on the individual compensation of the members of the board. The results obtained for the continental European context (Spain in particular) partially support the Human Capital Theory. Nevertheless, there is no evidence supportive of Agency Theory, as corporate governance mechanisms do not contribute to moderate the compensation of directors and there is no relationship between corporate performance and the compensation of directors. The analyses by subsamples (categories of directors) reveal that non-executive director’s compensation seems to be set for a group of individuals as a whole, depending mainly on firm-level characteristics, whereas executive director compensation is more based on the unique characteristics that a particular executive brings to the board.

Th e paper complements a new line of research that includes the fi rm heterogeneity in trade models. Th e central idea of this research is that only the largest and most effi cient fi rms are capable of exporting. However, the empirical evidence has confi rmed that a large number of SMEs is also involved in internationalisation. Given this context, the aim of the paper is to analyse the infl uence of collaborative networks between fi rms and institutions as an alternative mechanism to the small size of the majority of the fi rms in the agri-food industry. To this end, there was used a longitudinal panel between 1994 and 2012 comprising a sample of 342 Spanish fi rms involved in the business sectors of the food, meat, drink and tobacco industries, and a dynamic Heckman-Probit model was implemented. Th e fi rst stage studies the positive infl uence of collaborative networks in fi rms' decision to export and the second stage analyses the eff ect of cooperation mechanisms on export intensity. Th e results show a positive eff ect of business cooperation networks in both stages suggesting that SMEs can overcome the barrier of their small size in their internationalisation process through other mechanisms, such as collaborative networks.

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