2014
DOI: 10.1016/j.emj.2013.10.003
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Ownership structure and board composition in a high ownership concentration context

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Cited by 42 publications
(15 citation statements)
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References 39 publications
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“…Moreover, the board characteristics related to the independence of the directors do not reject the null hypothesis of the study, meaning that this result is in line with other studies, such as Berthelot et al (2012), Dal Vesco and Beuren (2016) and Acero Fraile and Alcalde Fradejas (2014). These studies found that the BD does not exert influence in the managerial decisions of firms in environments with high ownership concentration, and that corporate governance practices do not have an impact on business failure likelihood in their respective frameworks.…”
Section: Resultssupporting
confidence: 74%
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“…Moreover, the board characteristics related to the independence of the directors do not reject the null hypothesis of the study, meaning that this result is in line with other studies, such as Berthelot et al (2012), Dal Vesco and Beuren (2016) and Acero Fraile and Alcalde Fradejas (2014). These studies found that the BD does not exert influence in the managerial decisions of firms in environments with high ownership concentration, and that corporate governance practices do not have an impact on business failure likelihood in their respective frameworks.…”
Section: Resultssupporting
confidence: 74%
“…Acero Fraile and Alcalde Fradejas (2014) found a potential minors’ expropriation risk in highly concentrated ownership contexts, suggesting the need to establish other instruments that ensure the protection of the minors’ interests, since the BD’s independence may be insufficient. As reported by Richardson et al (2015), the directors may not be so committed in pursuing the shareholders claims during periods of FD because the debtholders have priority over shareholders in residual claims, so they gain disproportionately more benefits from outside director’s work.…”
Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In line with previous research, the largest firms are selected because of their representativeness (Goncharov et al, 2006;Albu and Girbina, 2015) and since they present greater agency costs and therefore corporate governance mechanisms are expected to be crucial (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). Particularly, agency conflicts are likely to be especially significant in Spanish firms, due to their special characteristics in relation to corporate governance, such as concentrated ownership and control, and a system based on a unitary board structure strongly dominated by the controlling shareholders (Acero and Alcalde, 2013;Manzaneque et al, 2016a). These characteristics make the Spanish context an interesting scenario to understand the role of corporate governance structures in the safeguard of the interests of all shareholders and stakeholders (La Porta et al, 1999;Manzaneque et al, 2016b).…”
Section: Sample and Datamentioning
confidence: 89%
“…This study employs a panel data methodology to test the hypothesis. This methodology addresses potential unobserved firm-level heterogeneity, can handle variability in the data, permits more degrees of freedom, and produces more efficient and consistent results (Baltagi, 2005;Fraile & Fradejas, 2014;Gujarati & Porter, 2009). The panel data methodology has been adopted in previous corporate governance and financial reporting quality studies (S. N. Abdullah & Ismail, 2016;Razzaque et al, 2016).…”
Section: Research Model and Control Variablesmentioning
confidence: 99%