“…In line with previous research, the largest firms are selected because of their representativeness (Goncharov et al, 2006;Albu and Girbina, 2015) and since they present greater agency costs and therefore corporate governance mechanisms are expected to be crucial (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). Particularly, agency conflicts are likely to be especially significant in Spanish firms, due to their special characteristics in relation to corporate governance, such as concentrated ownership and control, and a system based on a unitary board structure strongly dominated by the controlling shareholders (Acero and Alcalde, 2013;Manzaneque et al, 2016a). These characteristics make the Spanish context an interesting scenario to understand the role of corporate governance structures in the safeguard of the interests of all shareholders and stakeholders (La Porta et al, 1999;Manzaneque et al, 2016b).…”