ContentsExecutive summary 1. Introduction 2. Variation in nurse earnings 2.1 Total earnings 2.2 Allowances and premiums 2.3 Bank earnings 3. Geographical variation in earnings, hours and retention 3.1 Variation in total earnings and the cost of living 3.2 Hours and bank earnings 3.3 Allowances and premiums 3.4 Promotion rates 3.5 Retention and churn 4. How do trusts and nurses react to increases in cost of living? 4.1 Effects on earnings, hours and promotions 4.2 Retention and churn 5. Differences across groups 5.1 Impacts by initial band 5.2 Impacts by full-time work status 5.3 Impacts by age 5.4 Impacts by nationality 5.

1. The most recent official economic and fiscal forecasts, from March 2022, had the government meeting its fiscal targets with a current budget surplus (i.e. total revenues exceeding day-to-day spending) from 2023-24 onwards and underlying public sector net debt on course to fall, albeit modestly, as a fraction of national income from the same year. The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) calculated that the government's mandate to have debt forecast to fall was met by a margin of £28 billion.2. Much has changed. Under Citi's macroeconomic forecast, which underpins our analysis of the public finances, rising inflation and interest rates will add to public spending on working-age benefits, state pensions and debt interest. Recent policy decisions, such as the Energy Price Guarantee and the new government's package of permanent tax cuts, will also add to borrowing. Overall, we forecast that borrowing this year will be £194 billion, which would be £94 billion higher than the £99 billion forecast in March. Of this increase, £68 billion is explained by support for energy bills announced since March (net of revenues from the new energy profits levy).3. But more important for the sustainability of the public finances is the outlook for borrowing in the medium term. Even once the energy support packages are assumed to expire, borrowing remains elevated. There is huge uncertainty around the exact magnitude, but under a central forecast in 2026-27 we expect borrowing of £103 billion, which would be £71 billion higher than forecast in March. Much of this increase is uncertain -it will in particular depend on the path of the economy, inflation and interest rates -but less uncertain is £43 billion of the increase in borrowing, which is explained by the direct impact of the permanent tax cuts announced by the new Chancellor, Kwasi Kwarteng. 4. We forecast that spending on debt interest will be £103 billion in 2023-24, double the £51 billion forecast by the OBR in March and which was already an upwards revision on the £39 billion the OBR forecast in October 2021. Much of this increase in debt interest spending will dissipate as long as inflation falls back. But even in 2026-27 we forecast that debt interest spending will be £66 billion, some £18 billion higher than forecast by the OBR in March, £26 billion more than forecast in October 2021 and £9 billion more than was spent in 2021-22, as a result of higher interest rates and a higher level of accumulated debt. 5. In line with stated government policy, we assume that the government keeps broadly to the departmental spending plans set out a year ago. This is despite rising inflation eating into the implied real increases: restoring their generosity would require an additional £14 billion of spending in 2023-24 and £23 billion in 2024-25. Keeping to the existing cash spending plans is essentially imposing a rather hidden form of austerity on departments, and doing so in a rather arbitrary way, as it depends on the extent to which rising prices are adding to the spending press...

The project has been funded by the Nuffield Foundation under grant reference WEL/43516, but the views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily the Foundation. Visit www.nuffieldfoundation.org. Citi has also provided financial support, alongside the macroeconomic forecasts used in this analysis. The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the ESRC Centre for the Microeconomic Analysis of Public Policy (ES/T014334/1).They thank Paul Johnson and Ben Nabarro for helpful comments and input.Particular thanks are extended to Ben Nabarro for sharing Citi's latest economic forecasts, without which this briefing note would not have been possible.The changing economic outlook and the Spending Review

The outlook for the public finances under the long shadow of COVID-19 Carl Emmerson (IFS), Ben Nabarro (Citi) and Isabel Stockton (IFS) 11 Funding for Emmerson and Stockton was provided by the ESRC-funded Centre for the Microeconomic Analysis of Public Policy (ES/M010147/1). Funding from the UKRI under the grant 'Supporting fiscal policy through the crisis' (ES/V00381X/1) is gratefully acknowledged.

BackgroundBetter estimates of workers' willingness to pay to reduce commutes can help evaluate transport policy as well as innovations in workplace organisation implemented by firms (such as telecommuting). These measures could facilitate the employment of workers with care responsibilities by reducing commuting cost. ObjectivesWe estimate female workers' marginal willingness to pay to reduce commuting distance in Germany in a partial-equilibrium model of job search with non-wage job attributes. We consider heterogeneity by parenthood, regional structure and part-time status of workers and are moreover able to explore the role of housing cost, childcare and intra-household interactions for subsamples of the data. Methods and DataWe use national insurance data based on a 10\% sample of the German labour force including daily information on job spells, personal and job characteristics and residential and workplace post codes between 2000 and 2013 (a customised version of the ``Integrated Employment Biographies'' provided by the Institute of Employment Research, IAB). Taking advantage of the longitudinal structure of the data, our analysis uses a stratified Cox model to take better account of unobserved individual heterogeneity than the previous literature has been able to do. We control for housing costs using additional data on rents at the county level. FindingsWe find a substantial gender gap in marginal willingness to pay for reduced commuting distance between men and women which is not explained by individual unobserved heterogeneity. When women have their first child, their willingness to pay increases further. Preliminary results suggest that heterogeneity between urban, conurbational and rural areas in Germany plays a minor role in determining women's willingness to pay. ConclusionsSubstantial gender and motherhood gaps in implicit commuting cost provide an important link between the household and labour market in understanding gender and job choice, with implications for gender-sensitive labour market policy.