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In his influential book Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy Jacques Ranciere builds a substantial critique of liberal regimes present in most Western countries. He finds them defective because: (1) they allow wealth and economic power of groups and individuals to influence public decision-making, making those with economic power an elite group; (2) they allow knowledge and expertise of groups and individuals to influence public decision-making, making those with epistemic power an elite group; (3) they allow and encourage social and economic conditions that make people inappropriate for decision-making on important issues, making those with certain characteristics thus acquired an inferior group. We focus on the Ranciere’s second objection by relying on Estlund’s epistemic proceduralis approach and claim that one does not have to embrace postmodernist idea of reducing reason to relations of power in order to present a substantial critique of our contemporary society. Furthermore, we argue that one does not have to base egalitarian democracy on postmodernist ideas that reject the truth-tracking potential of democratic procedures – egalitarian democracy is perfectly compatible with the idea of truth in politics.

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Democratic procedures are characterized by the equal status of all citizens participating in the decision-making process. This procedural fairness represents one of the central aspects of democracy's legitimacy-generating potential and should not be rejected or weakened. However, citizens specialize in different areas and inevitably some citizens become more competent (i.e. become experts) regarding some political issues. Democratic procedure would loose much of its appeal if it would be unable to take advantage of the experts' knowledge. In this paper I follow Kitcher and Christiano in embracing a form of division of epistemic (and political) labour - citizens and their political representatives should deliberate and set aims the political community is to pursue, while experts and policy-makers should devise means (laws, public policies and political decisions) needed to achieve the aims set by citizens. However, citizens should not blindly trust the experts - their epistemic authority is derivative and social and academic networks and structures should be employed in order to enable citizens to assess and evaluate experts' competence, but experts' impartiality regarding the issue at hand as well. Consequently, the process should not be unidirectional: experts should be able to help citizens select feasible and coherent aims, while citizens should be able to help experts in creating policies and decisions. Deliberative democracy is an appropriate political setting for this kind of bidirectional communication.