Background: Usually the researchers performing meta-analysis of continuous outcomes from clinical trials need their mean value and the variance (or standard deviation) in order to pool data. However, sometimes the published reports of clinical trials only report the median, range and the size of the trial.

Mammalian Peptidoglycan Recognition Proteins (PGRPs) are a family of evolutionary conserved bactericidal innate immunity proteins, but the mechanism through which they kill bacteria is unclear. We previously proposed that PGRPs are bactericidal due to induction of reactive oxygen species (ROS), a mechanism of killing that was also postulated, and later refuted, for several bactericidal antibiotics. Here, using whole genome expression arrays, qRT-PCR, and biochemical tests we show that in both Escherichia coli and Bacillus subtilis PGRPs induce a transcriptomic signature characteristic of oxidative stress, as well as correlated biochemical changes. However, induction of ROS was required, but not sufficient for PGRP killing. PGRPs also induced depletion of intracellular thiols and increased cytosolic concentrations of zinc and copper, as evidenced by transcriptome changes and supported by direct measurements. Depletion of thiols and elevated concentrations of metals were also required, but by themselves not sufficient, for bacterial killing. Chemical treatment studies demonstrated that efficient bacterial killing can be recapitulated only by the simultaneous addition of agents leading to production of ROS, depletion of thiols, and elevation of intracellular metal concentrations. These results identify a novel mechanism of bacterial killing by innate immunity proteins, which depends on synergistic effect of oxidative, thiol, and metal stress and differs from bacterial killing by antibiotics. These results offer potential targets for developing new antibacterial agents that would kill antibiotic-resistant bacteria.

Background: The evaluation of research output, such as estimation of the proportion of treatment successes, is of ethical, scientific, and public importance but has rarely been evaluated systematically. We assessed how often experimental cancer treatments that undergo testing in randomized clinical trials (RCTs) result in discovery of successful new interventions. Methods: We extracted data from all completed (published and unpublished) phase 3 RCTs conducted by the National Cancer Institute cooperative groups since their inception in 1955. Therapeutic successes were determined by (1) assessing the proportion of statistically significant trials favoring new or standard treatments, (2) determining the proportion of the trials in which new treatments were considered superior to standard treatments according to the original researchers, and (3) quantitatively synthesizing data for main clinical outcomes (overall and event-free survival). Results: Data from 624 trials (781 randomized comparisons) involving 216 451 patients were analyzed. In all, 30% of trials had statistically significant results, of which new interventions were superior to established treatments in 80% of trials. The original researchers judged that the risk-benefit profile favored new treatments in 41% of comparisons (316 of 766). Hazard ratios for overall and event-free survival, available for 614 comparisons, were 0.95 (99% confidence interval [CI], 0.93-0.98) and 0.90 (99% CI, 0.87-0.93), respectively, slightly favoring new treatments. Breakthrough interventions were discovered in 15% of trials. Conclusions: Approximately 25% to 50% of new cancer treatments that reach the stage of assessment in RCTs will prove successful. The pattern of successes has become more stable over time. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that the ethical principle of equipoise defines limits of discoverability in clinical research and ultimately drives therapeutic advances in clinical medicine.

BackgroundDecision curve analysis (DCA) has been proposed as an alternative method for evaluation of diagnostic tests, prediction models, and molecular markers. However, DCA is based on expected utility theory, which has been routinely violated by decision makers. Decision-making is governed by intuition (system 1), and analytical, deliberative process (system 2), thus, rational decision-making should reflect both formal principles of rationality and intuition about good decisions. We use the cognitive emotion of regret to serve as a link between systems 1 and 2 and to reformulate DCA.MethodsFirst, we analysed a classic decision tree describing three decision alternatives: treat, do not treat, and treat or no treat based on a predictive model. We then computed the expected regret for each of these alternatives as the difference between the utility of the action taken and the utility of the action that, in retrospect, should have been taken. For any pair of strategies, we measure the difference in net expected regret. Finally, we employ the concept of acceptable regret to identify the circumstances under which a potentially wrong strategy is tolerable to a decision-maker.ResultsWe developed a novel dual visual analog scale to describe the relationship between regret associated with "omissions" (e.g. failure to treat) vs. "commissions" (e.g. treating unnecessary) and decision maker's preferences as expressed in terms of threshold probability. We then proved that the Net Expected Regret Difference, first presented in this paper, is equivalent to net benefits as described in the original DCA. Based on the concept of acceptable regret we identified the circumstances under which a decision maker tolerates a potentially wrong decision and expressed it in terms of probability of disease.ConclusionsWe present a novel method for eliciting decision maker's preferences and an alternative derivation of DCA based on regret theory. Our approach may be intuitively more appealing to a decision-maker, particularly in those clinical situations when the best management option is the one associated with the least amount of regret (e.g. diagnosis and treatment of advanced cancer, etc).

BackgroundDual processing theory of human cognition postulates that reasoning and decision-making can be described as a function of both an intuitive, experiential, affective system (system I) and/or an analytical, deliberative (system II) processing system. To date no formal descriptive model of medical decision-making based on dual processing theory has been developed. Here we postulate such a model and apply it to a common clinical situation: whether treatment should be administered to the patient who may or may not have a disease.MethodsWe developed a mathematical model in which we linked a recently proposed descriptive psychological model of cognition with the threshold model of medical decision-making and show how this approach can be used to better understand decision-making at the bedside and explain the widespread variation in treatments observed in clinical practice.ResultsWe show that physician’s beliefs about whether to treat at higher (lower) probability levels compared to the prescriptive therapeutic thresholds obtained via system II processing is moderated by system I and the ratio of benefit and harms as evaluated by both system I and II. Under some conditions, the system I decision maker’s threshold may dramatically drop below the expected utility threshold derived by system II. This can explain the overtreatment often seen in the contemporary practice. The opposite can also occur as in the situations where empirical evidence is considered unreliable, or when cognitive processes of decision-makers are biased through recent experience: the threshold will increase relative to the normative threshold value derived via system II using expected utility threshold. This inclination for the higher diagnostic certainty may, in turn, explain undertreatment that is also documented in the current medical practice.ConclusionsWe have developed the first dual processing model of medical decision-making that has potential to enrich the current medical decision-making field, which is still to the large extent dominated by expected utility theory. The model also provides a platform for reconciling two groups of competing dual processing theories (parallel competitive with default-interventionalist theories).