Future generations of air traffic management systems may give appropriately equipped aircraft the freedom to change flight paths in real time. This would require a conflict avoidance and resolution scheme that is both decentralized and cooperative. We describe a multiagent solution to aircraft conflict resolution based on satisficing game theory. A key feature of the theory is that satisficing decision makers form their preferences by taking into consideration the preferences of others, unlike conventional game theory that models agents that maximize self-interest metrics. This makes possible situational altruism, a sophisticated form of unselfish behavior in which the preferences of another agent are accommodated provided that the other agent will actually take advantage of the sacrifice. This approach also makes possible the creation of groups in which every decision maker receives due consideration. We present simulation results from a variety of scenarios in which the aircraft are limited to constant-speed headingchange maneuvers to avoid conflicts. We show that the satisficing approach results in behavior that is attractive both in terms of safety and performance. The results underscore the applicability of satisficing game theory to multiagent problems in which selfinterested participants are inclined to cooperation.

The next generation of air traffic control will require automated decision support systems in order to meet safety, reliability, flexibility, and robustness demands in an environment of steadily increasing air traffic density. Automation is most readily implemented in free flight, the segment of flight between airports. In this environment, centralized control is impractical, and on-board distributed decision making is required. To be effective, such decision making must be cooperative. Satisficing game theory provides a theoretical framework in which autonomous decision makers may coordinate their decisions. The key feature of the theory is that, unlike conventional game theory which is purely egotistic in its structure, it provides a natural mechanism for decision makers to form their preferences by taking into consideration the preferences of others. In this way, a controlled form of conditional altruism is possible, such that agents are able to compromise so that every decision maker receives due consideration in a group environment. Simulations demonstrate that reliable performance can be achieved with densities on the order of 50 planes per ten thousand square miles.

The next generation of air traffic control will require automation in order to meet safety, reliability, flexibility, and robustness demands in an environment of steadily increasing air traffic density. Optimization, however, is an inadequate paradigm for the design of a cooperative distributed air traffic control system. The problem stems from a fundamental limitation of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities, which do not account for sophisticated social behavior such as situational altruism. Social utility functions overcome this limitation by permitting decision makers to expand their spheres of interest beyond the self via conditional utilities. Satisficing game theory provides a decision strategy that permits decision makers to compromise in the interest of achieving both individual and group goals and presents a mathematical framework for the design of sophisticated cooperative multiagent societies. Simulation results in a variety of geometric scenarios show promising performance in terms of efficiency and flexibility even with high traffic densities.

Negotiation procedures that are founded on the doctrine of individual rationality, where each participant is committed to maximizing its own satisfaction, are limited in their ability to accommodate the interests of others, and therefore, may unnecessarily constrain the negotiability of a decision maker, particularly in cooperative environments. Satisficing game theory provides a distinct alternative to the hyperrationality of conventional rational choice by waiving reliance on the individual rationality premise and offering an approach to negotiatory decision making that is based on a well-defined mathematical notion of satisficing, or being good enough, that permits the modeling of complex interrelationships between agents. This approach provides a mechanism to compute the attitude, or degree of conflict or contentedness, of the negotiators. Examples illustrate both single-round and multiround satisficing negotiation protocols.

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