We describe a system to support decision-making on the ethical acceptability of animal experiments for scientific researchers and others responsible for ethical decision-making in animal experiments. The system consists of eight steps. Each step contains a number of substantive questions or a computational rule, leading to a well-articulated moral judgment on specific animal experiments. The system comprises a number of moral assumptions and pre-emptive norms, but leaves enough room for moral discretion and personal responsibility. The general ethical ideas behind the moral choices and assumptions are sketched and potential objections to the overall approach are discussed.

In the past decades the Three Rs concept, famously launched by Russell and Burch in their 1959 book The Principles of Humane Experimental Technique, has gained a prominent place in the landscape of societal and ethical concern about animal use. Important scientific and institutional initiatives have been taken in order to promote replacement, reduction and refinement. It appears, however, that conceptual and ethical thinking about the presuppositions and changing contexts of the Three Rs concept has lagged behind the scientific and practical efforts. In this paper, first, I argue that there is a threefold argument to make for the need to reconsider the moral basis of the Three Rs concept. Second, I outline a number of standard assumptions of the traditional approach to the Three Rs and question the tenability of these assumptions. Third, I propose some elements of a new framework for the Three Rs principle and connect this to a number of developments in science and society. I conclude with four remarks on the future of the ethics of the Three Rs principle.

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There are many definitions of animal welfare. These do not only differ in their meaning, but also in their function for making a broad concept accessible for scientific research. Lexical [dictionary] definitions establish what the common meaning is of the concept to be studied, and help to find some concrete phenomena which are related to the often vague and general descriptive terms. Explanatory definitions provide an elementary theoretical background for studying the phenomena. Operational definitions contain the parameters used in concrete measurements. In each step we reduce the concept to more measurable elements but lose other elements of the concept. In the case of animal welfare this results in an evolution of definitions which makes animal welfare more objectively assessable. But it also results in an erosion: development of a confusing diversity in parameters and a loss of the moral aspect of the concept of animal welfare. This erosion has a negative influence on political decisionmaking. It is important to recognize the possibilities and limitations of problem solving, based on ‘animal welfare science’.

This article deals with the ethical aspects of companion animal ownership. Research was done by means of interviews (n = 40) and questionnaires (n = 871). Respondents were randomly chosen from Dutch telephone directories. Euthanasia, docking tails, ear clipping and sterilisation are discussed on the basis of the opinions of respondents. Owners of companion animals very often seem to have insufficient knowledge about animal behaviour. Companion animal owners as a group differ rather strongly in their moral opinions about the acceptability of certain actions towards animals. At the individual level also people are not always consequent in their reasoning as was illustrated by their opinions about ear clipping and the stopping of tail docking and vice versa. Respondents live in a community with animals and usually use a utilitarian balancing model. The different outcomes of the uses of this balancing model indicate how far the respondents are willing to adapt their life style to the needs of an animal; in other words to what extent intrinsic values and integrity are taken into account within the process of (re)creating a living community.