No abstract

Evidence presented here is consistent with a failure of stock prices to reflect fully the implications of current earnings for future earnings. Specifically, the three-day price reactions to announcements of earnings for quarters t + 1 through I + 4 are predictable, based on earnings of quarter r. Even more surprisingly, the signs and magnitudes of the three-day reactions are related to the autocorrelation structure of earnings, as if stock prices fail to reflect the extent to which each firm's earnings series differs from a seasonal random walk.

The returns earned by U.S. equities since 1926 exceed estimates derived from theory, from other periods and markets, and from surveys of institutional investors. Rather than examine historic experience, we estimate the equity premium from the discount rate that equates market valuations with prevailing expectations of future f lows. The accounting f lows we project are isomorphic to projected dividends but use more available information and narrow the range of reasonable growth rates. For each year between 1985 and 1998, we find that the equity premium is around three percent~or less! in the United States and five other markets.

We examine the valuation performance of a comprehensive list of value drivers and find that multiples derived from forward earnings explain stock prices remarkably well: pricing errors are within 15 percent of stock prices for about half our sample. In terms of relative performance, the following general rankings are observed consistently each year: forward earnings measures are followed by historical earnings measures, cash flow measures and book value of equity are tied for third, and sales performs the worst. Curiously, performance declines when we consider more complex measures of intrinsic value based on short‐cut residual income models. Contrary to the popular view that different industries have different “best” multiples, these overall rankings are observed consistently for almost all industries examined. Since we require analysts’ earnings and growth forecasts and positive values for all measures, our results may not be representative of the many firm‐years excluded from our sample.

Despite the conceptual appeal and popularity of the differential timeliness (DT) measure of conditional conservatism proposed in Basu (1997), Dietrich et al. (2007) and Givoly et al. (2007) have identified considerable biases associated with that measure. We renew their call to avoid using the DT measure because it is affected unexpectedly by two empirical regularities—namely, scale is negatively related to (1) deflated mean earnings and (2) variance of stock returns. Even though these regularities are unrelated to conditional conservatism, their joint effect is substantial and pervasive. More importantly, prior findings regarding time-series and cross-sectional variation in differential timeliness are confounded by corresponding variation in these regularities. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from sources identified in the article.