For the methods of thinking that are living activities in men are not objects of reflective consciousness.-Charles S. Peirce (1892, CP 3.404

The aim of this paper is to describe Dewey's reception in the Spanishspeaking countries that constitute the Hispanic world. Without any doubt, it can be said that in the past century Spain and the countries of South America have been a world apart, lagging far behind the mainstream Western world. It includes a number of names and facts about the early translation of Dewey's works in Spain, Chile, Cuba, Mexico and Argentina in the first half of the century and a brief explanation of the decline of Dewey in the second half. To a great extent, Dewey's conception of education was immersed in the international movement of reform that started at the turn of the century and would eventually slowly but surely, renovate the structure of the educational system throughout the entire century, including that of South America. But it is equally clear that the Spanish-speaking countries have displayed a general ignorance of Dewey and, by extension, of American pragmatism during most of the century. In spite of mutual incomprehension, a deep affinity between Dewey's pragmatism and Hispanic philosophy is suggested in this paper, anticipating that the gradual process of democratization of Spain and the Hispanic countries of South America may be in some sense related to the rediscovery of Dewey and to the application of his key ideas in education. After decades of neglect of Dewey and of his contribution, there is a strong feeling not only that his conception of things is important to understand the last century but that Dewey -along with Peirce and other American classical pragmatists -may very well prove to be a key thinker for the XXIst century also in the Hispanic world. Along this vein, the recent resurgence of pragmatism can be understood not as the latest academic fashion but the occasion to start to close the gap between the two worlds.

Algo sorprendente en el estudio académico sobre Charles S. Peirce a lo largo de los años ha sido la poca atención dada a las dimensiones religiosas del pensamiento de Peirce. El objetivo de este artículo es subrayar que para Peirce la creencia en Dios no sólo es un producto natural de la abducción, del “instinto racional” o de la conjetura educada del científico o del hombre común, sino también que la abducción de Dios es, para Peirce, la “prueba” del pragmatismo. No sólo la creencia en Dios es capaz de cambiar la conducta del creyente, sino también, de acuerdo con Peirce –en “The Neglected Argument” y en otros lugares–, es la realidad de Dios la que da sentido a todo la empresa científica.

A previous version of this text was presented at the William James centennial celebration held in the University of Coimbra in November of 2010. I am very grateful to Edmundo Balsemao Pires for his kind invitation to take part in that event. A previous version was presented in September 2010 in a conference held in Oxford by the Rothermere American Institute. I am really grateful to Giovanni Maddalena, Erik Norvelle, Jason Panone and Hilary Putnam for their help, and to the Department of Philosophy of Harvard University for its generous hospitality to prepare this paper. I am also indebted with Howard G. Callaway and Rossella Fabbrichesi for their useful suggestions to my presentation in Coimbra.