This article argues that there is much confusion surrounding Serbia's landmark decision to engage in a process of normalization with Kosovo. Rather than undergoing a process of Europeanization, whereby a fundamental transformation in the underlying rationale and processes of decision-making occurred, as some have argued, the changes in Serbia's policy are in fact based on material concerns. By tracing relations in the EU-Serbia-Kosovo triangle, the article shows that change in Serbia's approach towards Kosovo is based on pragmatism and political opportunism, rather than absorption, adaptation, convergence or identity formation. What we have witnessed is a more short-term, interest based policy shift serving very specific economic purposes. In conceptual terms, this is better understood as a policy of rationally instrumental 'pre-Accession Europeanization' rather than as a process of adaptive normative Europeanization as more conventionally understood in the literature.

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This document is the author's final accepted version of the journal article. There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are advised to consult the publisher's version if you wish to cite from it. Engagement without Recognition: The Limits of Diplomatic Interaction with Contested States AbstractThis article examines the extent to which states are able to interact at an official level with a contested or de facto state -a state that has unilaterally declared independence but is not a member of the United Nations -without being understood to have recognised it. This is an area of increasing interest and relevance to policy makers. As is shown, albeit with some significant provisos, legal theory and historic practice suggest that diplomatic engagement does not constitute recognition if there is no underlying intent to recognise. This means that there is a very high degree of latitude regarding the limits of state engagement with contested states, especially in bilateral contexts. Indeed, the level of engagement can even amount to recognition in all but name.

In recent years, the United Arab Emirates has increased its engagement on the international stage. One area where it has been increasingly active is the Western Balkans. While its aid programmes were initially directed towards Albania, it has also started to invest in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia. This paper focuses mainly on the last of these: UAE commercial investment in Serbia. As is shown, this activity has been focused on four key sectors: aviation, urban construction, military technology and agriculture, chosen to reflect different strategic imperatives. Whereas investments in agriculture and military technologies are part of a strategy of risk mitigation in respect of food security and military security, the investments in aviation and construction form part of a wider strategic policy of economic diversification in anticipation of the post-oil economy. Meanwhile, viewed from the Serbian perspective, these investments have not been without controversy because of their lack of transparency, allegations of corruption, and lack of public debate over plans to transform downtown Belgrade with a substantial new investment in urban regeneration. Serbia's willingness to host strategic investment from the UAE is also surprising because of UAE support for Kosovo and claims that it has come with questionable political demands. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that UAE investments are a welcome boost to an ailing and crisis ridden economy.

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