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Although the presence of objective formula-based grants is an important component of a stable, equitable and efficient system of intergovernmental fiscal relations, the final incidence of grants is not always according to what is stated in the formula because there are other intervening institutional factors. Furthermore, the intergovernmental grant mechanism itself is often a function of the same interests or forces that ultimately drive the incidence of grant resources. This paper relates the horizontal allocation of intergovernmental grants directly to their potential underlying determinants, including normative policy issues, voter choice arguments and political considerations. An international comparison of empirical incidence studies reveals that besides local expenditure needs and local fiscal capacity, other factors including political influence and a jurisdiction's size play important and consistent roles in determining the horizontal allocation of per capita intergovernmental grants

Since 1999, Tanzania has been actively pursuing reforms of the way in which the central government finances local government activities. This article looks at the potential problems with the mechanism that the central government currently uses to distribute budget resources among the 114 local government authorities and sets out to reveal the incidence of central government allocations to local authorities in Tanzania. Two strands of economics literature-the public choice literature and the political economy literature-consider the distribution of central government resources across local governments. Using regression analysis, this study specifies an incidence model that reveals the determinants of variations in local government allocations in Tanzania. The empirical analysis only finds weak evidence supporting the presumed pro-poor allocation of some local government resources by the central government in Tanzania. Instead, the study finds more convincing support for substantial pro-wealthy and pro-urban tendencies in the way in which central government officials divide public resources across local government units.

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