The BOP is a complex construction with multiple parts and systems integrated. Any single failure will affect the overall functionality of the BOP. A key question will always be whether a particular failure has such an adverse effect on the overall functionality that the BOP needs to be pulled for repair and hence drilling halted. The presentation will outline how a BOP is broken down into a detailed fault tree. The fault tree is modeled in the software tool RiskSpectrum® originally developed for assessing process safety of nuclear power plants. Once a failure of any part in the BOP assembly is detected, the information is fed into the model, and the effect on the overall availability of the BOP is evaluated through a predefined methodology. The results are displayed to the crew onboard through any easy to understand mimic. The operating crew onboard an offshore drilling unit can then continuously monitor the availability of the BOP and make decision on their further actions based on real time facts on BOP status.The BOP model has been developed under a contract with and funding from a major drilling operator and Lloyd's Register, with BOP manufacturers being directly involved. US Authorities has been kept informed on the development. A joint industry panel with representative from Mobile Drilling Unit Owners, BOP manufacturers and Operating Companies has been overseeing the work.The model has been launched and training of the operators has been carried out. Results from the implementation will be available at the presentation at the conference.

This paper was selected for presenta{lon by an SPE Program Commttee following review of mformahon wntamed !n an abstract submdted by the author(s) Contents of the paper, as presentc!d, have not been rewewed by the ScmIeiy of Petroleum Engineers @ are subjectec 10 correction by the autfmr[s) The material, as presented dces not necessarily reflect any posmon of the Scaety of Petroleum Engineers, Its offcers, or members Pa@rs presented al SPE meebngs are subject to pubhcat,on rev!ew by Edrlorlal Committees of the Sc.mty of Petroleum Engineers Permlssmn to copy IS restncled to an abstract of not more than 300 worasIllustrations may not be copied The abstract should contain cansplcuous acknowledgement of where an by whom Ihe paper was presented Write Llbrablan, SPE P O Box 933936 Rchardson TX 750783-38?6 U S A, fax 01-214-952-9435 Abstract NORSOK (The competitive standing of the Norwegian offshore sector ) is the Norwegian industry initiative to add value, reduce cost and lead time and remove unnecessary activities in offshore field developments and operations.The NORSOK standards are developed by the Norwegian petroleum industry as a part of the NORSOK initiative and are jointly issued by the Norwegian Oil Industry Association and the Federation of Norwegian Engineering Industries. The purpose of the industry standard is to replace the individual oil company specifications for use in existing and future petroleum industry developments, subject to the individual company's review and application.The NORSOK Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) standards covers: -Technical Safety, -Working Environment, -Environmental Care, HSE during Construction. The standards are now being used in ongoing offshore development projects, and the experience with standards shows that the principle aim is being met. The development of standards continues, implementing experience gained.

No abstract

TX 75083-3836, U.S.A., fax 01-972-952-9435. AbstractProtection of pressurized process equipment against fire and thus reducing the risk of fire escalation is a key concern for all process plants both offshore and onshore.

Following the Piper Alpha disaster in UK 6 July 1988, with 167 fatalities, a major shift was called for in the Safety Regulatory Scheme in UK. Among changes introduced were requirements to Safety Case. In Norway, a similar scheme had already been in practical use for some years. Other countries as Australia have later introduced similar regulations. In some countries as e.g. China, Brazil and Indonesia, some Operating Companies are following similar schemes although not specifically required by the regulations. For mobile drilling Units (MOU) the IADC has developed a global Case Guideline which is recognized by Authorities, Owners and Operating Companies. The challenge is to ensure that the Safety Case is addressing the critical safety aspect of the operations, applying state of the art methodologies and data and keep the Safety Cases up to date as "living and useful document". The conveyance of useful information to personnel in first line of command onboard is another challenge. The well prepared Safety Case may be an important instrument in conveying the understanding of major hazard risk potential to employees and the training for handling emergency situations. When MOUs are sailing from one part of the world to another, the Safety Case sails with. A Safety Case prepared for one country is normally accepted in another; subject to a site specific update Experiences from MOUs use of Safety Cases when moving around is discussed. The directions from the preliminary investigations after the GOM blowout may point towards a shift in the regulatory requirement in US Deepwater operations towards more functional requirements. It is LR view that functional requirements will be a valuable supplement to the more prescriptive approach that has been the standard. Introduction Safety Regimes normally changes in the aftermath of major accidents. The marine industry has been suffering from loss of ships and crews/passengers since man started his voyages on seas, and the step change improvements to the marine industry have often been in the aftermath of major losses. E.g. the LR Ship Classification Rules have been subject to changes continuously since LR was founded in 1760. The offshore oil and gas industry is very closely related to the marine industry. Growing up with the offshore industry in Norway it is very natural to remind myself of the Alexander Kielland Accommodation rig which capsized in 1980, causing 123 fatalities and a lot of survivors with traumas for the rest of their lives. The safety regime in Norway changed, reflecting the focus from public and the politicians as well as the owners and other stakeholders. Similar, the Piper Alpha accident in 1988 on the British Continental shelf shifted the regulatory regime in UK significantly. In both cases the industry as well as the regulators recognized the need for revised technical standards as well as e need for improved work processes to improve the overall safety standard. One of the very important consequences from the accidents mentioned above was the increased focus on R&D; new and improved knowledge was required and this enabled both budgets and management attention wherefrom improved methodologies and tools could be developed. There were some new basic fundamental requirements established, e.g. the need for a well structured and documented safety management system. An industry standard for Safety Management has been established since then e.g. documented in ISO standards and industry standards such as API.