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This paper studies the effect of an emission tax on the relocation decision in a duopoly with vertical product differentiation. We establish the relationship between an exogenous product quality markup, relocation cost, and emission taxation in a two-country-setting for three cases: (a) an environmental tax set only by one country, (b) non-cooperative environmental taxation in both countries, and (c) coordinated environmental taxation. We show that a larger product quality markup and, thus, weaker competition can serve as a substitute for environmental policy as both reduce emissions. However, weaker competition makes firm relocation more likely, which results in emission shifting instead of emission reduction. The higher the product quality markup, the more likely it is that at least one firm relocates to the foreign country. Emission taxation in the foreign country changes location decisions: If also the foreign country applies an emission tax, at least one firm stays in the home country. If both governments set taxes non-cooperatively, the low-quality firm always stays in the home country. If both countries set taxes cooperatively, both firms are more likely to stay in the home country. However, relocation of the low-quality firm is a possible outcome under cooperative taxation.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may MINIMUM QUALITY STANDARDS AND EXPORTSLaura Birg Jan S. Voßwinkel Minimum Quality Standards and ExportsLaura Birg Jan S. Voßwinkel June 2015Abstract This paper studies the interaction of a minimum quality standard and exports in a vertical product di¤erentiation model when …rms sell global products. If ex ante quality of foreign …rms is lower (higher) than the quality of exporting …rms, a mild minimum quality standard in the home market hinders (supports) exports. The minimum quality standard increases quality in both markets. A welfare maximizing minimum quality standard is always lower under trade than under autarky. A Minimum quality standard reduces pro…ts for the exporting …rm. It increases domestic welfare, but reduces welfare in the export market.JEL Classi…cation: F12, L13, L50

Bicameral parliaments are a normal feature of constitutions in federal states. They are often said to be used because of their stabilizing function for intransitive collective decisions. Intransitive decisions may occur because of logrolling. But while theory states the ubiquity of voting cycles, cycles are observed very rarely. The article argues that logrolling does not lead to cycles, but to coalitions, that are stable for a time period. The reason lies in the endogeneity of alternatives in collective decisions, as is shown by Buchanan/Congleton (1998). If logrolling does not lead to cycles, but to stable outcomes, bicameral parliaments do not stabilize collective decisions. But they alter the nature of equilibrium outcomes. The article applies these findings to the Deutscher Bundesrat.

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may MINIMUM QUALITY STANDARDS AND COMPULSORY LABELING: MORE THAN THE SUM OF ITS PARTSLaura Birg, Jan S. Voßwinkel Minimum Quality Standards and Compulsory Labeling:More than the Sum of its Parts.Laura Birg Jan S. Voßwinkel December 2014Abstract This paper studies the e¤ect of a minimum quality standard, a compulsory labeling scheme, and the combination of both instruments in a vertical di¤erentiation model when not all quality dimensions of products can be observed byconsumers. Both a minimum quality standard on the non-observable quality dimension and a labeling scheme that informs consumers about the non-observable quality dimension have no impact on the observable quality dimension, increase prices, and have no impact on demand. The combination of a minimum standard and a labeling scheme increases prices, reduces or enhances investment in the observable quality dimension, and alters market shares depending on the minimum quality level. Compared to the case of no regulation, social welfare may decrease or increase under the minimum quality standard, the compulsory labeling scheme or the combined scheme, depending on the level of the minimum quality standard and the market size. JEL Classi…cation: L13, L15, L51