What informs ordinary citizens' attitudes toward the use of force? Previous research identifies several key concerns in public opinion toward war, but does not directly evaluate the relative importance of these considerations. We articulate three distinct logics of war support-moral, legal, and instrumental-and use an experimental survey with 3,000 U.S. respondents to test how ordinary citizens make trade-offs among multiple competing imperatives relevant for decision making in war. Our design is the first to isolate to what extent substantive legal demands, instrumental military imperatives, and specific moral principles are reflected in respondents' preferences. Although all logics have some resonance, we find that respondents' preferences are remarkably consistent with several core demands of international law even though respondents are not told that the legality of the use of force is at stake. Only the imperative to minimize U.S. military casualties overwhelms both legal and moral demands.

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This article suggests that the best available normative framework for guiding conduct in war rests on categories that do not echo the terms of an individual rights-based morality, but acknowledge the impossibility of rendering warfare fully morally justified. Avoiding the undue moralization of conduct in war is an imperative for a normative framework that strives to actually give behavioral guidance to combatants, most of whom will inevitably be ignorant of the moral status of the individuals they encounter on the battlefield and will often be uncertain or mistaken about the justice of their own cause. We identify the requirement of military necessity, applied on the basis of what we refer to as the “St. Petersburg assumption”, as the main principle according to which a combatant should act, regardless of which side or in which battlefield encounter she finds herself. This pragmatic normative framework enjoys moral traction for three reasons: first, in the circumstances of war it protects human life to a certain extent; second, it makes no false claims about the moral justification of individual conduct in combat operations; and, third, it fulfills morally important functions of law. However, the criterion of military necessity interpreted on the basis of the St. Petersburg assumption does not directly replicate fundamental moral prescriptions about the preservation of individual rights.

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