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This article introduces the Peace Accords Matrix Implementation Dataset (PAM_ID). We present time-series data on the implementation of 51 provisions in 34 comprehensive peace agreements negotiated in civil wars since 1989. We follow the implementation process for up to ten years following the signing of each agreement. The data provide new insights into the types of provisions that are more or less likely to be implemented, how implementation processes unfold over time, how implementation processes relate to one another, and how implementation affects various post-accord outcomes. We outline our coding methodology and case selection, and examine descriptive statistics. We illustrate one potential use of the data by combining eight different provisions into a composite indicator of security sector reform (SSR). A survival analysis finds that implementing security sector reforms contributes to long-term conflict reduction not only between the parties to the accord but also between the government and other non-signatory groups in the same conflict.

The signing of a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA) is often seen as a historic milestone in a peace process, and its implementation takes a highly legitimized set of reforms and puts it front and center in national politics. This article examines the aggregate implementation of CPAs signed since 1989 and future conflict behavior between the negotiating parties and between the government and non-signatory groups. It argues that implementation is both a peace-building process and an outcome that normalizes political relations between hostile groups, solves commitment problems and addresses the root causes of civil conflict. Statistical tests utilizing new data on the implementation of CPAs support the argument. The extent to which an agreement is implemented is shown to have significant long-term effects on how long peace lasts – an effect that applies not only to the signatories of the agreement, but also to the government and non-signatory groups.

We argue that the duration of the peace after civil wars is mainly a function of the extent to which the outcome of the previous civil war preserved a condition of multiple sovereignty and the extent to which the post-civil war environment creates incentives for dissident groups to resort to violence rather than sustain the peace. Hazard models suggest that the outcome of the previous conflict does affect the duration of the peace, and this effect varies across time. The introduction of peacekeeping forces has a substantial positive effect on peace duration. We also find evidence of a curvilinear relationship between ethnic fractionalization and post-civil war peace duration. Based on these results, we conclude with recommendations for how peace can be maintained after a civil war.

The dominant theoretical approaches to civil war negotiations in the