Many research ethics guidelines now oblige researchers to offer research participants the results of research in which they participated. This practice is intended to uphold respect for persons and ensure that participants are not treated as mere means to an end. Yet some scholars have begun to question a generalised duty to disclose research results, highlighting the potential harms arising from disclosure and questioning the ethical justification for a duty to disclose, especially with respect to individual results. In support of this view, we argue that current rationales for a duty of disclosure do not form an adequate basis for an ethical imperative. We review policy guidance and scholarly commentary regarding the duty to communicate the results of biomedical, epidemiological and genetic research to research participants and show that there is wide variation in opinion regarding what should be disclosed and under what circumstance. Moreover, we argue that there is fundamental confusion about the notion of "research results," specifically regarding three core concepts: the distinction between aggregate and individual results, amongst different types of research, and across different degrees of result veracity. Even where policy guidance and scholarly commentary have been most forceful in support of an ethical imperative to disclose research results, ambiguity regarding what is to be disclosed confounds ethical action.

Objective To explore, among online visitors to an Alzheimer’s disease (AD) website, the self-expressed desire for, envisioned reaction to, and basic understanding of presymptomatic AD-related genetic and biomarker tests. Patients and Methods Information about presymptomatic testing, and an online multiple choice format survey were posted from November 1, 2012 through June 20, 2013 on the AD Prevention Registry website (www.endALZnow.org). Results Of 4036 respondents, 80.8% wanted genetic testing if paid by insurance; 58.7% if it would cost them at least $100. 80.2% wanted biomarker testing. If found to be at high risk for AD, 90.5% endorsed that they would “pursue a healthier lifestyle,” but 11.6% endorsed “seriously consider suicide.” The implication of a positive genetic test was incorrectly understood by 13.1%, and 32.6% failed to view a positive biomarker test as evidence of either increased risk for or the presence of AD. Conclusion Despite efforts to increase public awareness of AD, our survey results suggest that greater education of the public is needed. Interested patients should probably undergo psychological screening to identify those at high risk of adverse psychological outcomes, and disclosure of presymptomatic test results should be anchored to tangible constructive action plans such as healthy lifestyle changes, long term care planning, and when available and appropriate, participation in research trials.

Many scientists and philosophers of science are troubled by the relative isolation of developmental from evolutionary biology. Reconciling the science of development with the science of heredity preoccupied a minority of biologists for much of the twentieth century, but these efforts were not corporately successful. Mainly in the past fifteen years, however, these previously dispersed integrating programmes have been themselves synthesized and so reinvigorated. Two of these more recent synthesizing endeavours are evolutionary developmental biology (EDB, or "evo-devo") and developmental systems theory (DST). While the former is a bourgeoning and scientifically well-respected biological discipline, the same cannot be said of DST, which is virtually unknown among biologists. In this review, we provide overviews of DST and EDB, summarize their key tenets, examine how they relate to one another and to the study of epigenetics, and survey the impact that DST and EDB have had (and in future should have) on biological theory and practice.

This paper critically examines the biology of species identity and the morality of crossing species boundaries in the context of emerging research that involves combining human and nonhuman animals at the genetic or cellular level. We begin with the notion of species identity, particularly focusing on the ostensible fixity of species boundaries, and we explore the general biological and philosophical problem of defining species. Against this backdrop, we survey and criticize earlier attempts to forbid crossing species boundaries in the creation of novel beings. We do not attempt to establish the immorality of crossing species boundaries, but we conclude with some thoughts about such crossings, alluding to the notion of moral confusion regarding social and ethical obligations to novel interspecies beings.