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In Heidegger's last seminar, which was in Zähringen in 1973, he introduces what he called a "phenomenology of the inconspicuous" (Phänomenologie des Unscheinbaren). Despite scholars' occasional references to this "approach" over the last 40 years, this approach of Heidegger's has gone largely under investigated in secondary literature. This article introduces three different, although not necessarily conflicting ways in which these sparse references to inconspicuousness can be interpreted: (1) The a priori of appearance can never be brought to manifestation, and the unscheinbar (inconspicuous) is interwoven with the scheinbar (appearing) as an active characteristic or form of "hiddenness" (Λήθη), therefore making inconspicuousness inherent within all phenomenology. (2) Or, there is now a particular step or reduction within phenomenology that involves one's being attuned to the various modes of potential hiddenness (Verborgenheit and its cognates), of which "inconspicuousness" is a particular character trait. Or (3) there are particular, unique, and specific phenomena that give themselves "inconspicuously," and there is also thus a corresponding, particular phenomenology in which one must engage in order to gain some kind of access to these specific things' phenomenal strata. This paper introduces Heidegger's "phenomenology of the inconspicuous" most especially in his last seminar in Zähringen in 1973, engages related references to unscheinbar in his 1942/1943 Seminar on Parmenides, and then puts forward an interpretation of what these somewhat ambiguous references could mean when

When the apocalyptic is marginalized, not only is theology under threat of malpractice, but phenomenology is also, for at the core of apocalyptic thinking is the attempt to restrain the totalities that are at work implicitly in our social imaginaries. Most totalities are subtle, appearing even in efforts of unification through global peace. One might extract such insight from Günther Anders, who depicts an immanent, apocalyptic reality beyond the pale of bourgeois optimism and the theological imaginaries that enervate it. We have fallen out of imaginative touch with our everyday activities, and this has resulted in an apocalyptic blindness (Apokalypse-Blindheit) and optimism rooted in abstraction. Such blindness has degraded our "conscience" into "conscientiousness" to the point that even the Hiroshima bomber can abstract from his actions and be exempted easily from responsibility. Although a kind of phenomenologist, Anders criticized colleagues who, in the name of "presuppositionlessness" and observation, could abstract their thoughts far from the reality in which they lived and acted. This paper provides a general introduction to Anders' work and interprets his "Transcendence of the Negative" in order to demonstrate the values of "apocalyptic phenomenology" today. Anders extends a Levinasian eschatology of anticipation (which is precisely of that which one cannot "expect") and demonstrates how transcendence, which typically is understood only in its positive element, also holds the capacity for turning a blind eye to the negative sociality of action. This transcendence often fuels a false optimism for an order of global peace and oneness, which inherently brings about an apocalyptic age, for it ends at "one" and eliminates any "outside". Apocalyptic phenomenology can be one way to disrupt this tendency of blind abstraction by attending to "unveiling" (apokalypsis) itself, attuning our "conscience" to the level of concern proportionate to the threats that stand before it, and becoming "restrainers" of what Anders calls "annihilism.

If there is such a ‘post-secular’ milieu, mindset, or thesis, it will need to furnish its own interpretation of the ‘world’ in ways distinct from those championed by the secular. Indeed an essential aspect of the ‘secular’ is how it has interpreted the ‘world’ (kosmos) as the ‘space, time, and age’ (Latin saecularis) in which things come into presence clearly, neutrally, and obviously. This paper interprets and compares some of Heidegger’s (especially the Heraclitus Seminars) and Henry’s (especially ‘Phenomenology of Life’) specific engagements with the theme of ‘world’, and how each thinker claims the world itself is presentable as a phenomenon, namely, via disclosive moods and the self-revelation of life. Since the world can appear, and its phenomenality can be presented, an inquiry into the specific, inconspicuous means by which the experiences of the world’s neutrality, clarity, and obviousness might yield phenomenological description. What presents itself as neutral is precisely what demands attention by merit of its hiddenness.

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