The current paper seeks to illustrate the conflict between habituation and moral autonomy and explain the Islamic view in this regard. The methodology of this research is qualitative and Islamic classical sources have been used to further elucidate Islam's stance, as we have referred to some articles and resources to understand the concept of habituation method and its contradictions with moral autonomy. The achievement of the paper is realising the contradiction between the habituation method and moral autonomy and habituation's incompatibility with the rational growth and development of the youth which is the goal of Islamic education. Therefore, this method cannot be accepted in Islamic moral education. On the other hand, there are some narratives in the Islamic sources that apparently have recommended this method, so another important achievement of the article is the proper interpretation of these narratives, presented for the first time. According to this interpretation, these narratives do not recommend the habituation method, but rather the continuity and maintenance of the action. Therefore, there is no disapproval in Islamic sources in this regard, and these sources reject the use of this method in moral education. The paper concludes by saying that the habituation method is not an Islamic method of education, and Islamic narrations have not recommended it. This paper comes with a suggestion that education scholars and policy makers need to extract other methods from the Islamic sources and devise them according to scientific findings instead of using this method.

This article endeavours to show the compatibility of significant trends in the largest Islamic theological school, namely the Ashari, with the authority of reason in ethics. On the one hand, this authority requires reason to understand moral values while, on the other, proving that this authority does not conflict with the creation of actions by God. Asharism has accepted the ability of reason to understand moral values, while also accepting practical reason. Moral values and their antithesis are examples of good and evil and can be understood by rational reasoning. Nevertheless, Asharism also regards acts as the creation of God, yet without negating the ability of reason to understand good and evil. This article explains the differences between the Asharites and Mutazilites regarding the authority of independent reason in ethics. The negation of the ability of reason to discern God's acts and commands, thereby accepting the need for religion, has made the Asharite theological school unique. Accordingly, religion and reason are the two references in ethics within this school. This article concludes that the authority of reason is compatible with Asharism if we base our reading on the view of many prominent Ashari scholars. Furthermore, this foundation could be used to study the compatibility of Islam with modern ethical theories.

The current article seeks to present a model that reconciles Islamic teachings with the intellectual and scientific achievements of modernity. It attempts to develop a model that systematises the discourse on Islam and modernity while preserving its Islamic identity using qualitative methods. Thus, this article introduces a model called ‘moderate Islamic modernism’. This model does not acknowledge the achievements of modernity in their entirety, but only those intellectual and scientific achievements that are free from certain bias elements. This article will first distinguish between the proposed moderate model and that of ‘extreme Islamic modernism’. Secondly, this article compares the model with ‘Islamic traditionalism’. In brief, the proposed moderate model advocates the reconciliation of Islamic teachings with the intellectual and scientific achievements of modernity, as well as reforming the traditional method. The article concludes that the ‘moderate Islamic modernism’ approach to modernity and its rational elements not only provides a theoretical solution but is also compatible with genuine Islamic teachings. It is hoped that the two methods proposed by the model, particularly its method for differentiating elements within modernity, and its new approach on Islamic studies, will benefit future research on the subject matter.

needs to form its own opinion on the concepts of rationality and freedom as they are raised in this theory. The article derives a conclusion that acceptance or rejection of autonomy has a significant impact on the goals and methods of moral education. Thus, Islamic education may need to reflect and open its doors on the goals and methods. To summarize the article; Islamic education needs to further evaluate the theories of autonomy and clarify its position on this theory with regard to eucation. This article suggests more discussion of the theory of autonomy is made in Islamic circles.

This article is a study of the Brethren of Purity’s thirty-seventh epistle, The Essence of Love. It compares this work with the treatises on love written by the Muslim philosophers Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardī, and Mullā Ṣadrā, the leading representatives of the Peripatetic, Illuminationist, and Transcendental schools of Islamic philosophy, respectively. A fundamental distinction of the Brethren’s approach is their positive impression of love between human beings, including its romantic and conjugal components. Such love is not entirely under human control; the celestial spheres also exercise their influence. The Brethren contend that society and civilization prosper because of love. Unlike several others, they are intent on reconciling divine or “real” love with love between individuals. While the Brethren praise the benefits of romantic love and conjugal relations, Ibn Sīnā judges them harmful, and Suhrawardī a distraction. Mullā Ṣadrā, though, takes an intermediate position, influenced by both the Brethren and Ibn Sīnā.