After a merger, company officials face the challenge of making compensation schemes uniform and of redesigning teams with managers from companies with different incentives, work habits, and recruiting methods. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between executive pay and performance after a merger by dissociating the respective influence of shifts, which occur in both compensation incentives and team composition. The results of a real task experiment conducted with managers within a large pharmaceutical company not only show that changes in compensation incentives affect performance, but also suggest that the sorting effect of incentives in the previous companies impact cooperation and efficiency after the merger. Replicating this experiment with students showed differences in strategy rather than in substance between the two groups of subjects with managers appearing performance driven, while students are more cost driven.executive and team-based compensation, subject pool effects, real task experiment, incentives, sorting, mergers

The European Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) has chosen to adopt an auctioning procedure to initially allocate CO 2 emission permits. Free allocation of permits will become an exception for the third phase (2013-2020) and most firms will have to buy all their permits on the market or via auctions. The ability of bidders to collude is a key concern about the design of the auction format. To counter collusion, the auction can be open to bidders without compliance obligations (speculators). This paper aims at studying experimentally speculation as a collusion-breaking device in two different auction mechanisms: the uniformprice sealed-bid auction and the ascending clock auction. Our results suggest that a uniform sealed-bid auction open to speculators should be chosen from a revenue maximization point of view. In this mechanism, compliance agents adopt an aggressive strategy toward speculators. This strategy significantly increases the seller's revenue, compared to the more collusive clock auction. In the latter, on the contrary, bidders accommodate speculators, letting them buy permits in the auction and buying their necessary permits on the secondary market. However, as opening the auction to speculators deteriorates efficiency, the regulator faces a trade-off between these two objectives.

We use a laboratory experiment to study how perceptions of skill influence teamwork. Our design is based on Gervais and Goldstein (2007) theory of teams. Team output is increasing in skill and in effort, skill and effort are complements, and workers' effort choices are complements. An overconfident agent thinks that his skill is higher than it actually is. We find that the presence of overconfident workers in teams is beneficial for firms since it raises effort provision and team output. We also find that overconfidence leads to a Pareto improvement in workers' payoffs. In contrast, underconfidence is detrimental to firms as well as workers. JEL Codes: D81; C91.

In this paper, we propose and study a first risk model in which the insurer may invest into a prevention plan which decreases claim intensity. We determine the optimal prevention investment for different risk indicators. In particular, we show that the prevention amount minimizing the ruin probability maximizes the adjustment coefficient in the classical ruin model with prevention, as well as the expected dividends until ruin in the model with dividends. We also show that the optimal prevention strategy is different if one aims at maximizing the average surplus at a fixed time horizon. A sensitivity analysis is carried out. We also prove that our results can be extended to the case where prevention starts to work only after a minimum prevention level threshold.