No abstract

HAL is a multidisciplinary open access archive for the deposit and dissemination of scientific research documents, whether they are published or not. The documents may come from teaching and research institutions in France or abroad, or from public or private research centers. L'archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, émanant des établissements d'enseignement et de recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires publics ou privés.

This paper is an attempt to clarify and assess Dennett's opinion about the relevance of the phenomenological tradition to contemporary cognitive science, focussing on the very idea of a phenomenological investigation. Dennett can be credited with four major claims on this topic: (1) Two kinds of phenomenological investigations must be carefully distinguished: autophenomenology and heterophenomenology; (2) autophenomenology is wrong, because it fails to overcome what might be called the problem of phenomenological scepticism; (3) the phenomenological tradition mainly derived from Husserl is based on an autophenomenological conception of phenomenology, and, consequently, can be of no help to contemporary cognitive science; (4) however, heterophenomenology is indispensable for obtaining an adequate theory of consciousness. In response to Dennett's analysis, the paper develops two main counterclaims: (1) Although the traditional conception of phenomenology does indeed fit Dennett's notion of autophenomenology, his sceptical arguments fail to rule out at least the possibility of a modified version of this traditional conception, such as the one defended in Roy et al. (Naturalizing Phenomenology, 1999); (2) the distinction between autophenomenology and heterophenomenology is at any rate misconceived, because, upon closer analysis, heterophenomenology proves to include the essential characteristics of autophenomenology.Key words heterophenomenology . autophenomenology . skepticism . Dennett . Husserl Dennett and the phenomenological traditionDaniel Dennett is exceptional on many counts as a philosopher of cognitive science. One of these counts is his interest for the phenomenological tradition that emerged Phenom Cogn Sci (

Although olfaction is a modality with great inter-individual perceptual disparities, its subjective dimension has been let aside in modern research, in line with the overall neglect of consciousness in experimental psychology. However, following the renewed interest for the neural bases of consciousness, some methodological leads have been proposed to include subjectivity in experimental protocols. Here, we argue that adapting such methods to the field of olfaction will allow to rigorously acquire subjective reports, and we present several ways to do so. This will improve the understanding of diversity in odor perception and its underlying neural mechanisms.