In emerging markets, supply chains increasingly serve as critical value chains through which ideas, practices and knowledge flow to and from suppliers and buyers. Drawing on buyer‐supplier collaboration literature and organizational learning theory, we examine the antecedents and underlying mechanisms of product co‐development. Due to emerging markets' unique institutional environments, we further investigate how government intervention and guanxi importance moderate supplier‐buyer collaborative outcomes. Dyadic data from 323 supplier‐buyer pairs in China largely support our theoretical framework. Partners' knowledge commonality has a curvilinear (inverted U‐shaped) relationship to product co‐development, whereas goal compatibility has a positive impact on product co‐development. Mutual learning partially mediates the main effect. Furthermore, government intervention weakens the positive effect of mutual learning on product co‐development whereas guanxi importance strengthens this relationship. This research provides fresh theoretical and managerial implications to supply chain collaboration in emerging markets.

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Institutional forces influence the formation of international joint ventures (IJVs) in emerging economies and shape both their parents' behaviors and their marketing strategies. Whereas previous research has centered on governance mechanisms that deter opportunism, this study investigates the influence of institutional forces (i.e., rule of law, government intervention, and dysfunctional competition) on the IJV's foreign parent's opportunism. The authors find that rule of law and dysfunctional competition curtail opportunism, whereas government intervention drives opportunism. In addition, relationships between institutional forces in local markets and the IJV's foreign parent's opportunism depend on the IJV's marketing capability. The authors further examine the influence of the foreign parent's opportunism on IJV relationship extendedness and find support for a negative relationship between opportunism and the IJV's continuity. This study enriches institutional theory and identifies the boundary of the influence of institutional forces on opportunism. Because opportunism is a critical relationship hazard, the findings of this study have important implications forIJVs' partnership management.