The study attempts to demonstrate a structurally-based consistency to subjects' object relations as measured across various independent ratings. Particular interest was aimed at the capacity of the Rorschach to tap developmentally crucial aspects of the structure of patients' object relations. A scale was developed to measure the degree to which relationships between figures on the Rorschach were perceived in terms of a mutuality of autonomy. These Rorschach ratings were then correlated with independent measures of this mutuality of autonomy dimension which were obtained from a written autobiography, and ratings by ward staff. Based on a sample of 40 inpatient subjects, the resulting intercorrelation among measures proved to be highly significant.

This study examines the use of excerpted Rorschach responses for rating object relations. This assessment of object relations focuses on a dimension defined as Mutuality of Autonomy. A Rorschach Scale for Mutuality of autonomy is presented. Its application to excerpted Rorschach data is described. Raters did not apply the Mutuality of Autonomy Scale to the entire protocol as had been done previously (Urist, 1977). Instead, in an attempt to argue that Rorschach ratings in fact reflected Mutuality of Autonomy and not extraneous factors, ratings were based exclusively on excerpted responses. Reliability for the excerpting was at a high level of agreement, and the Rorschach Mutuality of Autonomy Scores based on these excerpts correlated significantly with independent clinical ratings of Mutuality of Autonomy.

After reviewing some of the difficulty around defining empathy, this paper draws attention to three underemphasized structural factors in the empathic tie between self and other. The following distinctions are drawn: (a) empathy vs. fusion with the object: (b) empathy vs. a narcissistic attachment to the object: and (c) empathy vs. an intuitive but fragmented orientation to part-objects. The relationship between Rorschach's M and empathy is reexamined in light of these considerations, and it is concluded that the experience of kinaesthesia on the Rorschach reflects some, but not all, of the components of empathy.

No abstract

Marty Mayman will be remembered as a uniquely gifted clinician, diagnostician, supervisor, and teacher. In this article, I link his distinctive capacity for empathic understanding to his reliance on self-representational and object representational concepts as a vehicle for accessing the inner life of his participant. Mayman's special brand of empathy was remarkable for its sensitivity to nuance as well as its ability to strike a chord with vivid resonance. His understanding of ego development included the notion that self-representation and object representation make up part of the internalized structure of all ego functions. Self- and object representations can be thought of as embedded in the individual's subjective experience of the very performing of those ego functions. Self- and object representations can also be thought of as embedded in the individual's attitudes toward the exercising of particular ego functions, for example, where the individual struggles with whether or not he or she feels a sense of permission to "own" or exercise specific ego capacities. In this article, I apply the use of self- and object representation as a way of "texturizing" the ego to the way object relations are embedded within affects. I use some Early Memory Test (Mayman, 1968) material to elucidate the role of object relational themes in the specific way in which affects are experienced.