No abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This paper was developed with financial support from the SBF Bourse de Paris and the New York Stock Exchange, and the assistance and comments of George Sofianos, Bill Tschirhart, Jean-Claude Cosset, Kathy Dewenter, Ranko Jelic, John Nellis, Rob Nash, Marc Lipson, Harold Mulherin, and Annette Poulsen is gratefully acknowledged. Earlier drafts of the authors' privatization works cited herein have benefited from comments received from participants at the 1993 National Bureau of Economic Research corporate finance conference, the 1994-1998 American Finance Association annual meetings, the 1994 American Economic Association meeting, the 1994 Political Economy Research Center Privatization Forum, the 1995-1998 Financial Management Association annual meetings, the 1995 European Finance Association meeting, the 1997 NYSE Cancun Conference on Global Equity Issuance, and seminars at the Copenhagen Business School, the Norwegian School of Management, the University of Chile, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Emory University, the University of Georgia, Florida State University, Virginia Tech, Indiana University, The University of Houston, and Tulane University. All remaining errors are the authors' alone. This study surveys the academic and professional literature examining the privatization of stateowned enterprises (SOEs), with a focus on empirical studies. The paper is written from the perspective of a policy-maker weighing the adoption of a national privatization program, who seeks answers to the following questions: (1) How large an impact have privatization programs actually had thus far on state involvement in different national economies?; (2) Has the decision to privatize been based on dissatisfaction with the economic performance of SOEs, and is there a viable policy alternative to divestment?; (3) Have privatization programs significantly improved the operating and financial performance of the companies divested?; (4) Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayOnce the decision to privatize is made, how do governments select the appropriate method and sequencing of selling state-owned assets?; (5) How do governments price the SOEs they wish to sell and how do they decide which potential buyers to favor?; and (6) Have investors who purchase the shares of privatized firms experienced positive short and long-term returns?Privatization has been instrumental in reducing state ownership in many countries and had a transforming effect on global stock markets, al...

No abstract

We study shareholder returns for firms that acquired five or more public, private, and0or subsidiary targets within a short time period. Since the same bidder chooses different types of targets and methods of payment, any variation in returns must be due to the characteristics of the target and the bid. Results indicate bidder shareholders gain when buying a private firm or subsidiary but lose when purchasing a public firm. Further, the return is greater the larger the target and if the bidder offers stock. These results are consistent with a liquidity discount, and tax and control effects in this market.Takeovers are one of the most important events in corporate finance, both for a firm and the economy. Extensive research has shown that shareholders in target firms gain significantly and that wealth is created at the announcement of takeovers~i.e., combined bidder and target returns are positive!. However, we know much less about the effects of takeovers on the shareholders of acquiring firms. Evidence suggests that these shareholders earn, on average, a zero abnormal return at the acquisition's announcement, though there is tremendous variation in these returns. Researchers have been unable to successfully explain much of this variation, partially because the announcement of a takeover reveals information about numerous things. For example, Grinblatt and Titman~2002, p. 708! state that the stock return at the time of the bid cannot be completely attributed to the expected effect of the acquisition on profitability, arguing that, "the stock returns of the bidder at the time of the announcement of the bid may tell us more about how the market is reassessing the bidder's business than it does about the

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This paper was developed with financial support from the SBF Bourse de Paris and the New York Stock Exchange, and the assistance and comments of George Sofianos, Bill Tschirhart, Jean-Claude Cosset, Kathy Dewenter, Ranko Jelic, John Nellis, Rob Nash, Marc Lipson, Harold Mulherin, and Annette Poulsen is gratefully acknowledged. Earlier drafts of the authors' privatization works cited herein have benefited from comments received from participants at the 1993 National Bureau of Economic Research corporate finance conference, the 1994-1998 American Finance Association annual meetings, the 1994 American Economic Association meeting, the 1994 Political Economy Research Center Privatization Forum, the 1995-1998 Financial Management Association annual meetings, the 1995 European Finance Association meeting, the 1997 NYSE Cancun Conference on Global Equity Issuance, and seminars at the Copenhagen Business School, the Norwegian School of Management, the University of Chile, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Emory University, the University of Georgia, Florida State University, Virginia Tech, Indiana University, The University of Houston, and Tulane University. All remaining errors are the authors' alone. This study surveys the academic and professional literature examining the privatization of stateowned enterprises (SOEs), with a focus on empirical studies. The paper is written from the perspective of a policy-maker weighing the adoption of a national privatization program, who seeks answers to the following questions: (1) How large an impact have privatization programs actually had thus far on state involvement in different national economies?; (2) Has the decision to privatize been based on dissatisfaction with the economic performance of SOEs, and is there a viable policy alternative to divestment?; (3) Have privatization programs significantly improved the operating and financial performance of the companies divested?; (4) Terms of use: Documents in EconStor mayOnce the decision to privatize is made, how do governments select the appropriate method and sequencing of selling state-owned assets?; (5) How do governments price the SOEs they wish to sell and how do they decide which potential buyers to favor?; and (6) Have investors who purchase the shares of privatized firms experienced positive short and long-term returns?Privatization has been instrumental in reducing state ownership in many countries and had a transforming effect on global stock markets, al...