This paper sets out to analyse the divergent models pursued by South Korea and Taiwan in regard to technological catching-up and their ongoing transition towards innovation-based economies. It is found that South Korea's former high-debt and chaebol-dominated model inclined it to pursue a Schumpeterian scale-based technological development, while Taiwan's former pro-stability, small- and medium-sized-enterprise (SME)-based model tended to favour its emphasis on a neo-Marshallian network-based technological development. It will be argued that the state's approach to economic liberalisation and firms' demand for capital for technological upgrading are the major factors that have underpinned the adjustment efforts of these two countries.

We discuss how global production networks interact with local institutions to shape the ways in which economic development occurs within a region; the region concerned being the Suzhou municipality in China. We argue that the development of Suzhou's information-technology industry has largely resulted from (1) the transformation of global production networks in the 1990s, in which Taiwanese firms played an important role; (2) the local states' active role in transforming local institutions to fit the needs of foreign firms; and (3) Taiwanese investors' engagement in mediating and transplanting related institutions into the locality to meet the demand of global logistics for speed and flexibility. All these have resulted in Suzhou municipality's rapid growth in the information-technology industry and its embeddedness in the fusion of the global and local contexts. However, we will also demonstrate that the power asymmetry of global players and local states in this area has resulted in the creation of industrial clusters that are institutionally embedded but technologically delinked from the localities.

This paper discusses different patterns of innovation and their institutional roots in Taiwan and South Korea. By using USPTO patent data as indicators of innovation, this paper finds that while individuals and small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) still account for a significant proportion of the patents in Taiwan, the large conglomerates are the major contributors of patents in South Korea. Moreover, although electronics is the sector that has gained most of the patents in both countries, Taiwan's patents are more dispersed while those of its South Korean counterparts are more concentrated. These differences come mainly from the institutional roots in their economic catching-up era.

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This article argues that the existing literature on world city formation overlooks geopolitics and political struggles in accounting for a city's transformation. Using Taipei as a case study, the article shows that geo‐economics, geopolitics and local politics each played an important role in Taipei's ambiguous world city formation in the late 1990s and are expected to continue to do so in the not too promising future. It is argued that the globalization process in the 1980s and the corresponding restructuring of the Taiwan economy induced the state to adopt a new developmental strategy that enhanced Taipei's competitiveness. However, the democratization process facilitated a new nation‐building process in the late‐1990s and the newly‐elected regime suppressed the city of Taipei's ongoing development, as a consequence of which Taipei's competitiveness as a regional world city has been declining. Geopolitics and local politics are thus found to explain to a large degree the ambiguities currently defining Taipei's world city formation. La littérature existante sur la formation des villes mondiales néglige les luttes géopolitiques et politiques dans ses explications de la transformation d'une ville. Prenant comme cas Taipei, l'article montre que géo‐économie, géopolitique et politique locale ont chacune joué un r^le important dans la formation complexe de cette ville mondiale vers la fin des années 1990, rôle qu'elles devraient conserver dans un avenir peu prometteur. Le processus de mondialisation des années 1980 et la restructuration subséquente de l'économie taiwanaise ont conduit l'´tat à adopter une nouvelle stratégie de développement, laquelle a renforcé la compétitivité de Taipei. En revanche, le processus de démocratisation a encouragé un processus de construction nationale dans la fin des années 1990 et le régime récemment élu a asphyxié l'évolution de cette ville, en conséquence de quoi la compétitivité de Taipei en tant que ville mondiale de la région a décliné. La géopolitique et la politique locale peuvent donc expliquer en grande partie les ambiguïtés qui définissent actuellement la formation de la ville mondiale de Taipei.