We claim that the animate and inanimate conceptual categories represent evolutionarily adapted domain-specific knowledge systems that are subserved by distinct neural mechanisms, thereby allowing for their selective impairment in conditions of brain damage. On this view, (some of) the category-specific deficits that have recently been reported in the cognitive neuropsychological literature - for example, the selective damage or sparing of knowledge about animals - are truly categorical effects. Here, we articulate and defend this thesis against the dominant, reductionist theory of category-specific deficits, which holds that the categorical nature of the deficits is the result of selective damage to noncategorically organized visual or functional semantic subsystems. On the latter view, the sensory/functional dimension provides the fundamental organizing principle of the semantic system. Since, according to the latter theory, sensory and functional properties are differentially important in determining the meaning of the members of different semantic categories, selective damage to the visual or the functional semantic subsystem will result in a category-like deficit. A review of the literature and the results of a new case of category-specific deficit will show that the domain-specific knowledge framework provides a better account of category-specific deficits than the sensory/functional dichotomy theory.

Priming for semantically related concepts was investigated using a lexical decision task designed to reveal automatic semantic priming. Two experiments provided further evidence that priming in a single presentation lexical decision task (McNamara & Altarriba, 1988) derives from automatic processes. Mediated priming, but no inhibition or backward priming was found in this type of lexical decision task. Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated that automatic priming was found only for associated word pairs, as determined by word association norms, and not for word pairs that are semantically related but not associated. It is argued that automatic priming in the lexical decision task occurs at a lexical level not at a semantic level.

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We report on two brain-damaged subjects who exhibit the uncommon pattern of loss of object color knowledge, but spared color perception and naming. The subject P.C.O., as in previously reported patients, is also impaired in processing other perceptual and functional properties of objects. I.O.C., in contrast, is the first subject on record to have impaired object color knowledge, but spared knowledge of object form, size and function. This pattern of performance is consistent with the view that semantic information about color and other perceptual properties of objects is grounded in modality-specific systems. Lesion analysis suggests that such grounding requires the integrity of the mesial temporal regions of the left hemisphere.