Synopsis The term ‘cognitive template’ originated from work in human-based cognitive science to describe a literal, stored, neural representation used in recognition tasks. As the study of cognition has expanded to non-human animals, the term has diffused to describe a wider range of animal cognitive tools and strategies that guide action through the recognition of and discrimination between external states. One potential reason for this non-standardized meaning and variable employment is that researchers interested in the broad range of animal recognition tasks enjoy the simplicity of the cognitive template concept and have allowed it to become shorthand for many dissimilar or unknown neural processes without deep scrutiny of how this metaphor might comport with underlying neurophysiology. We review the functional evidence for cognitive templates in fields such as perception, navigation, communication, and learning, highlighting any neural correlates identified by these studies. We find that the concept of cognitive templates has facilitated valuable exploration at the interface between animal behavior and cognition, but the quest for a literal template has failed to attain mechanistic support at the level of neurophysiology. This may be the result of a misled search for a single physical locus for the ‘template’ itself. We argue that recognition and discrimination processes are best treated as emergent and, as such, may not be physically localized within single structures of the brain. Rather, current evidence suggests that such tasks are accomplished through synergies between multiple distributed processes in animal nervous systems. We thus advocate for researchers to move towards a more ecological, process-oriented conception, especially when discussing the neural underpinnings of recognition-based cognitive tasks.