The spirit of 'public entrepreneurship', reignited by large-scale and long-term official finance from emerging economies, is now driving a process of 'creative destruction' in the established systems for governing official development finance primarily forged among advanced economies. In response to this burgeoning official finance from emerging economies once on the margins or outside of these established systems, potentially seismic shifts are occurring in three central governance systems-the reporting systems for official development assistance in the OECD Development Assistance Committee, OECD export credit disciplines and debt sustainability in the Bretton Woods Institutions. Emerging economies create competitive pressures that work to redress the undue rigidities in these established frameworks, opening the way to meeting vast development financing needs. If not well managed or coordinated, however, growing official finance runs the risk of further rounds of financial arms races and debt crises. To harness the processes of 'public entrepreneurship' as a force for good in realizing a transformative post-2015 development agenda requires international cooperation to reshape global governance of official development finance.

Efforts to understand the political complexities of water governance must include critical hierarchical or bureaucratical perspectives. The River Chiefs System, China’s national mechanism which has evolved from local attempts, values more political control than governance efficiency. Water governance, which is regarded as a political task, is allocated from river chiefs at higher levels to lower levels. The River Chiefs System stipulates that local river chiefs fully mobilize and integrate various technical and administrative forces to achieve environmental goals. However, the strengthening of local authority enables local river chiefs to combat or eliminate state power. Although public involvement in the River Chiefs System is encouraged to some extent, “government-dependent” public participation hardly ensures real public involvement and supervision.

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China is emerging as perhaps the most globally significant development finance provider, going far beyond concessional foreign aid. With China's initiatives to create and foster new multi-lateral finance institutions, and to work in terms of large economic landscapes in Africa, Eurasia, and Latin America, it becomes important to understand how China's own experience with rapid industrialization/urbanization processes and regional development is influencing its visions and financial instruments for development across the world. This paper examines how China's domestic development experiences have informed its approach to development finance abroad and explores what kinds of challenges and opportunities China will bring as it moves to the centre stage of international development finance.

This article explores the implications of China's rise for global reporting and monitoring systems (RMSs) in the field of development cooperation. Beyond its fast-growing -albeit still modest -foreign aid, China has emerged in the last decade as a globally pre-eminent source of development finance. While China's endeavours are comparable to previous rising powers that strived to build linkages into global commodity chains and to participate in advanced industrial and technology value creation, what makes China distinct from OECD capital providers is its unprecedented scale, cohesive state-market banking and enterprise institutions, and extensive utilisation of official finance for risk-taking. This poses an existential crisis for DAC's ODA reporting system, helping to precipitate a wide-ranging renovation process. Hence, China's intentions and capacities regarding the reporting and monitoring of its development finance have a potentially formative influence on the development of a new, wider DAC reporting system and on other international RMSs in the development finance field as well.