Manuscript Type: Empirical: Research Question/Issue: Directors can serve different roles: advisors, liaisons, or monitors. Affiliated outside directors have social or business/financial ties to firm executives, are often more trusted than others by the latter, have more knowledge of the firm, give better advice, or liaise more effectively with other organizations.However, they monitor less effectively than other outside directors do. This study theoretically predicts and empirically examines whether affiliated outside directors' contributions to firm value are moderated by corporate conditions: external control threats, uncertainty, government regulation, or information asymmetry.Research Findings/Insights: Panel data analysis shows that among firms that are standalone, have M&A threats, suffer financial distress, face financial uncertainty, or are subject to stricter government regulations, those with more affiliated outside directors-especially those with social ties-have greater firm value. In low information asymmetry environments, firms with more affiliated outside directors have lower firm value. In high information asymmetry environments, however, firms with more independent outside directors have lower firm value. These results remain robust after controlling for endogeneity issues of board composition, outside directors' human capital, social capital, CEO attributes, firm attributes, and industry attributes.Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study extends and links resource dependence theory and agency theory by showing how outside directors with social ties and those with business ties are related to firm value. Furthermore, the value of affiliated outside directors' resources and liaisons differ across corporate conditions, which extends resource dependence theory. Also, effective monitoring by unaffiliated outside directors requires sufficient access to firm information, which extends agency theory.Practitioner/Policy Implications: The relations of different outside directors to firm value across corporate conditions suggest that firms can benefit from considering their corporate conditions when designing the composition of their board of directors.

This paper examines whether the problem of high information asymmetry lowers the positive impact of board independence on firm value. Independent directors are outside directors who have never had business and professional ties with the firm. We adopt various proxies for information transaction costs from the market microstructure literature and traditional measures, such as firm size, firm age, number of analyst reports, governance scores, credit ratings, and institutional ownership, to see how they interact. Using data on publicly listed firms and their directors between 1999 and 2006 in Korea, we find that independent directors are correlated with higher corporate value when the firm has lower information transaction costs. The results suggest that the monitoring role of independent directors is limited when transferring firm‐specific information is costly.

This study analyzes changes in how corporate social responsibility (CSR) affects corporate value in China. We use multiple regression analysis on a sample of A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2009 to 2018. We divide the sample into 2009–2012 and 2013–2018 periods according to the development of CSR-related media and corporate policies. The dependent variable is corporate value, measured by Tobin’s Q. The independent variable is the CSR score calculated and published by RKS, a widely recognized CSR evaluation agency in China. We use firm size, sales growth rate, return on equity, top 10 shareholders’ equity, operating cash flow, and debt ratio as control variables. The panel-based regression models find no statistical correlation between CSR score and corporate value from 2009 to 2012 but find that the CSR score has a significantly positive influence on corporate value from 2013 to 2018. The impact of CSR activities on corporate value increases over the 10-year period. This decade saw the Chinese government shift its development strategy from a rapid growth model to a high-quality growth model and pursue sustainable development. This study is useful for Chinese companies considering adopting CSR activities to promote sustainable development.

Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to identify both the problems and their solutions in the corporate governance systems of Korean business groups (chaebols) in the wake of the Asian financial crisis.Design/methodology/approach -This is a conceptual paper and includes suggestions for improving international governance systems. Findings -In this paper, the author focuses on how chaebols should be restructured to improve the Korean economy. In order to figure out how they should be restructured, the author explains the positives and negatives of their current structure and how these can be modified/eliminated to make stronger corporate governance.Originality/value -The paper provides conceptual insights into systems and laws, which can be used to improve the corporate governance of business groups.