Research Summary: We investigate the extent to which firms rely on supranational institutional safeguards versus their non‐market capabilities to offset the risks of investing abroad. We argue that firms with non‐market capabilities are insensitive to supranational institutional safeguards when choosing the location of their international investments. We show that supranational agreements between an investor's home and host nation, operationalized as bilateral investment treaties (BITs), increase the likelihood of investment, but there is substantial firm heterogeneity with respect to this relationship. Firms with various forms of non‐market capabilities are not sensitive to BITs, whereas other firms are more likely to invest under BITs. We advance the understanding of how firm non‐market capabilities can substitute for supranational institutional arrangements in addressing risks associated with host country institutional weaknesses. Managerial Summary: The risk of expropriation is one of the main concerns companies have when investing abroad. Because of this, many countries implement bilateral investment treaties (BITs) to safeguard foreign investments, alleviate foreign investor concerns, and promote investments. We show that only those companies without political competence or political connections favor countries with BITs when choosing where to invest. Companies with political competence or political connections, on the other hand, ignore BITs and apparently rely on their ability to influence governments whenever their foreign investments face expropriation threats. As a result, politically connected or competent companies can enter markets most of their competitors lacking these capabilities shy away from. They can, therefore, do business in environments in which they face less competition.

Research Summary: We examine how firm political connections established through the political embeddedness of senior decision makers affect firms' foreign acquisition strategies. We argue that such political embeddedness affects the mental models of decision makers and, in turn, influences their preferences for particular strategies. We propose that political embeddedness leads to the formation of mental models that favor foreign acquisition strategies. We further argue that the firm embeddedness of politically embedded decision makers alters their mental models, thereby mitigating their inclination for such strategies. We find evidence consistent with our mental models explanation using a sample of foreign acquisitions made by French publicly traded firms during the 2009–2014 period. Overall, this study contributes to a better understanding of the mechanisms through which political connections impact global strategy. Managerial Summary: We investigate how firm political connections affect firms' foreign acquisition strategies. We argue that when firms have top decision makers with close connections to the government, they will make more foreign acquisitions. We further argue that this inclination toward foreign acquisitions is driven primarily by nonexecutive board members, with politically connected executives appearing to be more reluctant to engage in such strategies. We find evidence consistent with these ideas when examining foreign acquisitions made by French publicly traded firms managed by graduates of the prestigious ENA government school, which trains many government and senior civil servants in France.

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