Democracy and territory are two of the most important factors that affect conflict and war. Yet no research design looks directly at a possible interaction between these two variables to influence occurrence of armed conflict. This study seeks to answer the following question: “How do two democracies behave when a contentious issue such as territory arises as the source of conflict between them?” Results based on Militarized Interstate Dispute data from 1920 to 1996 produce the conclusion that the pacifying effect of democracy stands up for both territorial dyads and non‐territorial ones in spite of the imperatives toward militarization created by territorial conflict. However, territory of high salience still appears to increase the likelihood of armed conflict between two democracies.

Research confirms that interdemocratic conflicts are more likely to be resolved peacefully. However, do the usual results hold up for especially contentious issues such as territory? We use issue correlates of war (ICOW) data from 1816 to 1992 to build on Hensel (2001) and related studies to investigate the relationships between and among democracy, conflict management, and territory as an issue. The results create a puzzle for the democratic or neo-Kantian peace: When territory is at stake, issue-related variables come to the fore and matter more than regime type in explaining states' settlement strategies. The most important finding is that war experience between adversaries increases the likelihood of peaceful resolution, but decreases that of militarized disputes.

and Michael Colaresi Michigan State University this inference since they find an inconsistent effect for democracy on pacifying territorial disputes in the Western Hemisphere, although more recent work in Park and James (2014) shows a more consistent pacifying effect for democracies within territorial disputes.

This paper helps resolve the ongoing debate concerning whether the democratic peace is limited to the Cold War period. Some critics have attributed the democratic peace to a set of common interests among democracies that uniquely existed during the Cold War. This study is the first direct test of this proposition. I use a new measure of Cold War preferences to test if the effect of joint democracy is rendered statistically insignificant either during or after the Cold War as critics contend. I also test, as some democratic peace proponents have suggested, whether the pacifying effect of democracy is strengthened in the post-Cold War era. Evidence from period-specific logit analyses suggests that joint democracy promotes peace independently of Cold War security interests. Indeed, the democratic peace exists in the post-Cold War era.

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