Set/reset (Martin, 1986) hypothesis that contrast demands more cognitive effort than does assimilation was examined. In Exp. 1, the impressions of distracted Ss showed assimilation toward blatantly primed concepts, whereas the impressions of nondistracted Ss showed contrast. In Exp. 2, Ss told that their ratings would be lumped into a group average showed assimilation, whereas Ss told that their ratings would be examined individually showed contrast. In Exp. 3, the impressions of Ss low in need for cognition showed assimilation, whereas the impressions of Ss high in need for cognition showed contrast. Exp. 1 also showed that the results were not due to differences in recall of the target information, and Exp. 3 showed that the results were not due to differences in recall of the priming stimuli. Together, the results suggest that the processes involved in contrast demand more cognitive effort than do the processes involved in assimilation.

Two experiments were conducted to investigate the operation of social comparison processes within coaction. Percefved discrepancies between coactors' performance levels were induced by altering their feedback schedules. A subject was paired with a coactor who seemed to be performing either at a superior, inferior, or similar level. The pattern of results suggests that comparison processes are active components within coaction. An expectation-criterion level interpretation is discussed within a social comparison analysis.

Under what conditions, why, and for whom are framing effects most likely? In this paper, we build on the existing literature (e.g.

In 4 studies, the authors demonstrated that when errors associated with action were inconsistent with decision nakers' orientation, they were undesirable and produced more regret than did errors associated with inaction. Conversely, when errors associated with action were consistent with decision makers' orientation. they were desirable and produced less regret than did errors associated with inaction. Desirability and consistency mediated this relationship, independent of mutability. These results were obtained when judgments and decisions to act or not act were made in close temporal proximity to one another as well as when participants reflected on their past decisions. The authors provide an analysis of when counterfactuals would and would not be expected to mediate judgments of normality and regret.

High- and low-self-esteem group members received feedback about their individual performance as well as that of their own group and an out-group. They then evaluated both groups. Yoked-control observer individuals also provided group evaluations. In the in-group success/out-group failure condition, in-group enhancement tendencies were attenuated by individual failure feedback and augmented by individual success feedback. Low-self-esteem group members who received individual failure feedback showed favoritism toward the unsuccessful out-group over their own successful in-group. In the in-group failure/out-group success condition, in-group enhancement tendencies were attenuated by individual success feedback and augmented by individual failure feedback. Thus individuals' position in a social hierarchy mediates upward and downward social mobility strategies.