Decision making that favors short-term over long-term consequences of action, defined as impulsive or temporally myopic, may be related to individual differences in the executive functions of working memory (WM). In the first 2 experiments, participants made delay discounting (DD) judgments under different WM load conditions. In a 3rd experiment, participants high or low on standardized measures of imupulsiveness and dysexecutive function were asked to make DD judgments. A final experiment examined WM load effects on DD when monetary rewards were real rather than hypothetical. The results showed that higher WM load led to greater discounting of delayed monetary rewards. Further, a strong direct relation was found between measures of impulsiveness, dysexecutive function,and discounting of delayed rewards. Thus, limits on WM function, either intrinsic or extrinsic, are predictive of a more impulsive decision-making style.

Sleep deprivation affected distinct components of cognitive processing differentially. Dissociated non-executive components of cognition in executive functions tasks were degraded by sleep deprivation, as was control task performance. However, the executive functions of working memory scanning efficiency and resistance to proactive interference were not significantly affected by sleep deprivation, nor were dissociated executive processes of phonemic verbal fluency performance. These results challenge the prevailing view that executive functions are especially vulnerable to sleep loss. Our findings also question the idea that impairment due to sleep deprivation is generic to cognitive processes subserved by attention.

The somatic marker hypothesis formulated by Damasio (e.g., 1994;Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1991) argues that affective reactions ordinarily guide and simplify decision making. Although originally intended to explain decision-making deficits in people with specific frontal lobe damage, the hypothesis also applies to decision-making problems in populations without brain injury. Subsequently, the gambling task was developed by Bechara (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994) as a diagnostic test of decision-making deficit in neurological populations. More recently, the gambling task has been used to explore implications of the somatic marker hypothesis, as well as to study suboptimal decision making in a variety of domains. We examined relations among gambling task decision making, working memory (WM) load, and somatic markers in a modified version of the gambling task. Increased WM load produced by secondary tasks led to poorer gambling performance. Declines in gambling performance were associated with the absence of the affective reactions that anticipate choice outcomes and guide future decision making. Our experiments provide evidence that WM processes contribute to the development of somatic markers. If WM functioning is taxed, somatic markers may not develop, and decision making may thereby suffer.

Operant response rates often change within experimental sessions, sometimes increasing and then decreasing. The authors attribute these changes to sensitization and habituation to aspects of the experimental situation presented repeatedly (e.g., reinforcers) or for a prolonged time (e.g., the experimental enclosure). They describe several empirical similarities between sensitization-habituation and within-session changes in operant responding. They argue that many alternative explanations for within-session changes in operant responding can be dismissed. They also examine some implications of linking the literatures on habituation and operant responding. Because responding follows a similar pattern in several other cases (e.g., human vigilance, classical conditioning, and unconditioned responding), 2 relatively simple processes may be responsible for the temporal patterning of behavior in a wide variety of situations.

Pigeons were exposed to two types of concurrent operant-reinforcement schedules in order to determine what choice rules determine behavior on these schedules. In the first set of experiments, concurrent variable-interval, variable-interval schedules, key-peck responses to either of two alternative schedules produced food reinforcement after a random time interval. The frequency of food-reinforcement availability for the two schedules was varied over different ranges for different birds. In the second series of experiments, concurrent variable-ratio, variable-interval schedules, key-peck responses to one schedule produced food reinforcement after a random time interval, whereas food reinforcement occurred for an alternative schedule only after a random number of responses. Results from both experiments showed that pigeons consistently follow a behavioral strategy in which the alternative schedule chosen at any time is the one which offers the highest momentary reinforcement probability (momentary maximizing). The quality of momentary maximizing was somewhat higher and more consistent when both alternative reinforcement schedules were time-based than when one schedule was time-based and the alternative response-count based. Previous attempts to provide evidence for the existence of momentary maximizing were shown to be based upon faulty assumptions about the behavior implied by momentary maximizing and resultant inappropriate measures of behavior.