A series of three experiments employed a modified version of the Stroop task in order to document some conditions under which attention may be differentially deployed. It was shown that, within limits, subjects may choose either to selectively attend to a single stimulus or to distribute processing resources over several stimuli. Thus, attentional strategies may be actively chosen to suit prevailing conditions. Finally it was demonstrated that, once established, these different modes of attending are, themselves, differentially open to strategic modulation. RESUME Trois experiences, dans lesquelles est utilisee une version modifiee de la tache de Stroop, sont menees dans le but d'etudier les conditions dans lesquelles I'attention peut etre centree de facon differentielle. Les resultats montrent que, dans une certaine mesure, les sujets peuvent choisir, ou de porter leur attention de facon selective a un seul stimulus, ou de la distribuer sur plusieurs. Les strategies attentionnelles peuvent done etre choisies activement en fonction des conditions. Enfin les resultats montrent aussi qu'une fois etablis, ces differents modes d'attention sont euxmemes differentiellement sujets a des modulations strategiques.

Subjects in two experiments were asked to estimate how often items had appeared in a studied list. If the estimates are based on the value of a frequency attribute, the implicit question is, "How many times did you think of this item during study?" If, on the other hand, estimates are memorial attributions, the implicit question is, "How many study episodes does this item now make you think of?" In Experiment 1, subjects studied items that were repeated with the same or a different partner on each appearance. Items studied with a different partner each time received higher estimates than those with the same partner, but only if the items were semantic relatives of the partners. Thus, if tested items are strong cues for their partners, estimates of frequency benefit from contextual variety, implying that the partners are accessed during the test episode. In Experiment 2, several types of items were processed in several different ways. The result was that variables that enhance old-new discrimination also enhance the quality of estimates of frequency, implying that the two measures are based on the same cognitive stuff. Our conclusion is that judged frequency is attributed to items because of the memorial information they access at test.The research was supported by Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada Grant A8122 to Ian Begg. We thank Douglas Hintzman, John Jonides, and Robert Rose for their detailed comments on an earlier version, and Larry Jacoby, Lee Brooks, and Andrea Snider for helpful discussions. We thank Larry Jacoby for suggesting the attribute versus attribution terminology as a way to capture the distinction we had in mind.

Current theories of reading are used to predict the existence of at least 2 subtypes of poor readers, and results from 3 experiments with 27 good and 13 poor readers (Primary Mental Abilities Test) from the 3rd grade support this claim. Recoding poor readers relied heavily on a sound-based code and on submorphemic units while reading single words, whereas whole-word poor readers did not. It is argued that only an individual-differences framework coupled with current theory is rich enough to characterize reading disorders adequately. (French abstract) (29 ref)

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The paper concerns the relation between frequency estimates and recognition decisions. Theories postulating that these two measures reflect independent retrieval processes and theories that postulate that frequency estimation and recognition are mutually dependent processes are discussed. Empirical results apparently supporting both positions are also reviewed. Results of experiments in which instructions and test methods are varied factorially and results of conditional and correlational analyses establishing a dependency between frequency estimates and recognition decisions are taken as evidence supporting the dependent process view. However, the results do not permit discrimination within this class of theories.This paper concerns the relation between frequency estimation and recognition judgments. The position advocated in this article is that both tasks depend on access with the same memory information and that the same decision process subserves both tasks. To some extent the relation is forced, inasmuch as estimating that an item has occurred one or more times presupposes or includes a decision that the item has indeed occurred. However, this does not imply that recognition tests and frequency estimates, which are different tests of retention, are accomplished in the same manner. In fact, as we shall outline below, there are reasons to expect that different retrieval processes and different memory information are involved. First, however, let us consider the case for the dependency position, namely, that the same memory information accessed in the same way underlies performance in both tasks.Several theories of frequency information are in agreement with the dependency position, in that they characterize frequency estimates as transformations of general information. For example, Hintzman and Block's (1971) multiple-trace theory assumes that each occurrence of an item establishes a separate trace. Recognizing an old item requires contact with a trace, and frequency judgments require the additional stage of estimating the number of such traces. Similarly, Anderson and Bower (1972) assume that each occurrence of an item establishes a list marker at the permanent address of the item. Recognition requires the presence of at least one list marker, and frequency judgments require estimation of the number of list markers. Tversky and Kahneman (1973) also postulate that frequency judgments do not depend on any frequency-specific information, but rather, they are direct inferences from the