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I argue that one's views about which ''metaphysical laws'' obtain-including laws about what is identical with what, about what is reducible to what, and about what grounds what-can be used to deflect or neutralize the threat posed by a debunking explanation. I use a well-known debunking argument in the metaphysics of material objects as a case study. Then, after defending the proposed strategy from the charge of question-begging, I close by showing how the proposed strategy can be used by certain moral realists to resist the evolutionary debunking arguments. Keywords Debunking arguments Á Defeaters Á Material objects Á Laws of metaphysics Á Identity Á Reduction Á Grounding Moral beliefs, mathematical beliefs, religious beliefs, and beliefs about which composite objects exist have all been the target of so-called ''debunking'' arguments. Debunking arguments typically begin with the claim that there is a debunking explanation of some type of belief we hold. A debunking explanation is a complete causal explanation of the origins of some type of belief, which makes no reference to the facts that are those beliefs' putative subject matter. Once we concede the existence of such an explanation, the debunker contends, we thereby lose our justification for holding those beliefs. In this paper I shall argue that one's views about which ''metaphysical laws'' obtain-such as the laws about what is identical with what, about what is reducible to what, and about what grounds what-can be used block the epistemic threat posed by debunking arguments.

A fundamental fact is “pure” just in case it has no grounded entities—ex. Tokyo, President Biden, the River Nile, {Socrates}, etc.—among its constituents. Purity is the thesis that every fundamental fact is pure. I argue that Purity is false. My argument begins with a familiar conditional: if Purity is true, then there are no fundamental “grounding facts” or facts about what grounds what. This conditional is accepted by virtually all of Purity’s defenders. However, I argue that it is also the first step toward Purity’s undoing. For, if every grounding fact has a ground, then some grounded entities have “groundmates” or distinct grounded entities that share their full grounds. But, if there are groundmates, then Purity is false. So Purity leads to a contradiction. Therefore, it is false. I close by noting that my argument against Purity also gives us a powerful reason to think that some grounding facts are fundamental.

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