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This article explores how piracy was defined and eventually reduced in the South China seas between 1842-1869. In the early 1840s a large increase in maritime raiding led British agents to complain about the unwillingness of Qing officials to suppress disorder and drove the Hong Kong administration to propose its own solutions. British metropolitan officials nonetheless rejected many of these measures, arguing that they ran counter to established international maritime laws that made the Qing responsible for policing Chinese waters. Attempts were made to write this responsibility into the treaty which followed the Arrow War in 1860, but it was changes in the Qing state in the 1850s and 1860s which led Qing officials to treat small scale maritime raiding as seriously as that of large rebel pirate fleets. The new Imperial Maritime Customs Service created an incentive to prevent smuggling and piracy which could deter trade and hence decrease customs revenue. The case suggests, firstly, that the large reduction in maritime raiding rested on Sino-British compromise and, secondly, that Britain used international maritime laws as much to control the expansive ambitions of Hong Kong as to encourage changes in Qing practices. Acknowledgements This article was made possible by a United Kingdom Arts and Humanities Research Council Studentship, a Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation Doctoral Fellowship and a foreign scholars research grant from the Centre for Chinese Studies in Taipei. I am grateful to Robert Bickers for reading and commenting on drafts. I am also indebted to I

Many historians of China, particularly those based in North America, insist that the Qing dynasty's territorial expansion was imperial and comparable to the imperial expansions of other global empires. Other historians, particularly but not only those based in the People's Republic of China, continue to resist this interpretation. They argue that dynastic expansion in the Ming and Qing periods was simply a form of nation-state building, akin to similar processes in Europe. Rather than rejecting their claims as a product of Chinese nationalism, we argue that the term “empire” should be (re)understood as a global co-production, emerging from multiple intersecting histories and scholarly debates about those histories. Doing so challenges influential definitions of empire that rely on a distinction between empires and nation-states, highlighting their dual presence in both Euro-American and Chinese pasts (and presents). This move demands a rejection of periodizations that suggest that empires ceased to exist following the period of decolonization from 1945 to the 1970s. This opens up new avenues of historical and normative inquiry to acknowledge the modern continuity between empires and nation-states.

The memory of the foreign involvement in the Taiping war lasted long after the fall of the Taiping capital at Nanjing in 1864. The events were commemorated by various actors, Chinese and foreign, from the end of the war until the end of the treaty-port century in 1943 when the right to extraterritoriality was abrogated. This article explores the commemorations of the foreign role through three media: the issuing of medals to foreign fighters, the building of memorials to the foreign dead, and the writing of histories of the events. Across these media, different interest groups used the foreign interventions as a proxy for continuing debates about the role of foreigners in China and about China's place in the world. More broadly, the commemorations of the role of foreign fighters in the Taiping war is a case study in the transnational politics of memory. The memories of the war were contested or commemorated not just by states, but also by individuals and groups whose views often diverged from those of their government. By tracing how memories of the war were remembered and forgotten, we can trace the insecurities of different interest groups over time and their perceived power relative to each other.

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