Do populist leaders contribute to the spread of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)? While all governments have struggled to respond to the pandemic, it is now becoming clear that some political leaders have performed much better than others. Among the worst performing are those that have risen to power on populist agendas, such as in the United States, Brazil, Russia, India, and the United Kingdom. Populist leaders have tended to: blame "others" for the pandemic, such as immigrants and the Chinese government; deny evidence and show contempt for institutions that generate it; and portray themselves as the voice of the common people against an out-of-touch ‘elite.’ In our short commentary, focusing on those countries with the most cases, we find that populist leaders appear to be undermining an effective response to COVID-19. Perversely, they may also gain politically from doing so, as historically populist leaders benefit from suffering and ill health. Clearly more research is needed on the curious correlation of populism and public health. Notwithstanding gaps in the evidence, health professionals have a duty to speak out against these practices to prevent avoidable loss of life.

Introduction: Mental health problems increased during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Knowledge that one is less at risk after being vaccinated may alleviate distress but this hypothesis remains unexplored. This study tests whether psychological distress declined in those vaccinated against COVID-19 in the U.S. and whether changes in anticipatory fears mediated any association. Methods: A nationally representative cohort of U.S. adults ( n =8,090) in the Understanding America Study were interviewed every 2 weeks from March 2020 to June 2021 (28 waves). Difference-in-differences regression tested whether vaccination reduced distress (Patient Health Questionnaire 4 scores), with mediation analysis used to identify potential mechanisms, including perceived risks of infection, hospitalization, and death. Results: Vaccination was associated with a 0.04-SD decline in distress (95% CI= –0.07, –0.02). Vaccination was associated with a 7.77–percentage point reduction in perceived risk of infection (95% CI= –8.62, –6.92), a 6.91-point reduction in perceived risk of hospitalization (95% CI= –7.72, –6.10), and a 4.68-point reduction in perceived risk of death (95% CI= –5.32, –4.04). Including risk perceptions decreased the vaccination–distress association by 25%. Event study models suggest vaccinated and never vaccinated respondents followed similar Patient Health Questionnaire 4 trends pre-vaccination, diverging significantly post-vaccination. Analyses were robust to individual and wave fixed effects, time-varying controls. The effect of vaccination on distress varied by race/ethnicity, with the largest declines observed among American Indian and Alaska Native individuals (β= –0.20, p <0.05, 95% CI= –0.36, –0.03). Conclusions: COVID-19 vaccination was associated with declines in distress and perceived risks of infection, hospitalization, and death. Vaccination campaigns could promote these additional benefits of receiving the COVID-19 vaccine.

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Results highlight how network-level phenomena can operate distinctively from dyadic mistreatment processes. Dense personal networks seem to provide structural protection against elder mistreatment, even as many offensive acts are committed by those that are close to the victim and relatively well embedded in their network.

Recessions pose risks to mental health, yet the psychosocial mechanisms involved are less clear. One critical factor may be people's perceived control when faced with multiple recession hardships. Here we test a structural amplification hypothesis by assessing the role of perceived control as a mediator and moderator of the relation between recession shocks and psychological distress. We draw on waves 2 (2004–2006) and 3 (2013–2014) of the Midlife in the United States study (MIDUS), covering 1,739 US adults under age 75 from before and after the Great Recession. Our statistical models reveal that perceived control declines while distress rises in association with a greater accumulation of recession-related hardships. Perceived control partially mediated the recession hardships-distress association,attenuating it by about one-fifth. Further, perceived control modified the association between recession hardships and distress; individuals who reported larger declines in personal control had greater increases in distress, whereas those who experienced hardships but increased their perceived control did not exhibit significant changes in distress levels. Taken together, our findings support the structural amplification hypothesis, whereby an accumulation of recession hardships erode coping resources that would otherwise protect individuals from the mental health effects of stress exposure. Future research is needed to better understand sources of resilience at individual, community, and societal levels to help ameliorate sentiments of powerlessness and lack of perceived control during economic recessions.