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The Texas post-Furman death penalty statute restricts capital punishment to a limited category of murders. If the defendant is found guilty of one of these crimes, the jury must address two and sometimes three questions in the punishment phase of the trial. Affirmative answers to the questions by all jurors result in an automatic death sentence. A “no” answer to any question results in an automatic life sentence. One of the three questions is whether the defendant presents a continuing violent threat to society. From 1974 to 1988, niney-two capital murderers had their sentences commuted to life imprisonment. These commutations allow a “natural experiment” to assess the predictions made by jurors that these individuals would present a future violent threat to society. Patterns of institutional and post-release behavior of this group were compared to similar patterns for defendants convicted of capital murder who were not predicted to be dangerous and who received life imprisonment over the same fifteen-year period. We found that although most capital offenders were model inmates, two commuted capital prisoners committed second murders, one while in prison and the other while in the community. We conclude with a discussion of the validity of current death statutes that require jurors to predict future dangerousness.

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Guided discretion statutes were designed to control arbitrariness and discrimination in capital sentencing. Using data from Supplemental Homicide Reports and Trial Judge Reports, this article examines the issue of racial disparity in Missouri's capital punishment process from 1977 through 1991. Findings from the three decision points examined suggest racial bias against the killers of whites, particularly if the offender is black, and a concomitant devaluation of black victims. The strongest effects noted are in the prosecutor's decision to charge homicide offenders with capital murder and to proceed to penalty trial in convicted capital murder cases. While the effects are not necessarily limited to the least aggravated categories, the effects of race are strongest when prosecutors and jurors are freed from the seriousness of the cases to consider other factors. The racial disparities are also apparent in mid‐range cases up until the sentencing stage. However, disparities occurring earlier in the process are not rectified during sentencing. In fact, in the least aggravated cases, racial disparities are magnified at the sentencing stage.