No abstract

Résumé L’objectif de cet article est d’insister sur l’importance des notions d’incertitude radicale et de structures sociales, dès lors qu’il s’agit d’étudier le fonctionnement concret des marchés et des formes de concurrence qui y ont cours entre entrepreneurs. Pour ce faire, nous nous référons à deux courants théoriques qui prennent au sérieux ces notions dans leurs projets de recherche respectifs : l’économie post-keynésienne et la sociologie économique structurale. Notre réflexion théorique s’accompagne d’une mise en pratique à partir de données empiriques issues d’une enquête de terrain concernant trois cents restaurateurs de la métropole lilloise. Codes JEL : L16, L14, D43, D8

Résumé Mobilisant sociologie économique structurale et économie post-keynésienne, l’article montre que la question de la formation des prix nécessite de considérer le marché non pas comme un mécanisme de confrontation offre/demande, mais comme un « procès institutionnalisé » gouverné par différents rapports sociaux entre producteurs, consommateurs, salariés et fournisseurs. Nous appuyant sur une enquête empirique auprès de 300 restaurateurs lillois, nous montrons que les performances économiques des entreprises sont contraires aux résultats néoclassiques sur les effets de la concurrence par les prix.

This paper presents a novel perspective on industrial practices in modern competitive capitalist economies, questioning, in particular, the link between prices, competition, and the quality of goods and services. It tries to characterize a business practice that consists in reducing prices and maintaining (or increasing) profit margins by reducing the quality of goods and services while still presenting them as the same as before. The paper is primarily concerned with the practice of producing inferior quality goods by reducing the quantity of inputs used in the production process, or mixing inputs with cheaper constituents. The proposed term for this practice, “industrial seigniorage,” is based on the historical privilege of feudal lords (from Old French seigneur), who—possessing the right to mint gold coins—made a profit by adding cheaper base metals to the bullion. The present, essentially exploratory investigation attempts to delineate the widespread existence of such practices in various industrial sectors. It strives to explain the fundamental elements of consumer behavior that enable this practice to exist and discusses the effects of industrial seigniorage on several social issues. The attempt of the paper is finally to show that contrary to the ideology of capitalism, competition does not necessary lead to benefits for consumers or to an increase in product quality.

The article analyses the impact of price competition on inter-firms relationships, bank discrimination and wages inequalities in a Post Keynesian micro/macro perspective. It engages in the debate on the effect of price competitive pressures on profit margins. Underlying the ability of firms to transfer the constraint of price pressures to other agents in the economy, and the role of credit discrimination by banks, the paper focuses on the case of a transfer to suppliers and/or subcontractors. We then build a macroeconomic model of a disaggregated economy to show the global consequences of such a mechanism. Simulations suggest that price competition doesn’t lead to a reduction in profit margins but rather to increased wage inequalities. Furthermore, the effect on employment of price pressures is all the more reduced that these price pressures are transferred to other agents.