All preferential trading agreements (PTAs) short of a customs union use rules of origin (ROO) to prevent trade deflection. ROO raise production costs and create administrative costs. This paper argues that in the case of the recent wave of North-South PTAs, the presence of ROO virtually limits the market access that these PTAs confer to the Southern partners. In the case of NAFTA, we find average compliance costs around 6% in ad valorem equivalent, undoing the tariff preference (4% on average) for a large number of tariff lines. Administrative costs amount to 47% of the preference margin. These findings are coherent with the view that North-South PTAs could well be viewed like a principal-agent problem in which the Southern partners are just about left on their participation constraint

Since the middle of the nineteenth century, movement scientists have been challenged to explain processes underlying the control, coordination, and acquisition of skill. Information processing and constraints-based approaches represent two distinct, often perceived as opposing, views of skill acquisition. The purpose of this article is to compare information processing and constraints-based approaches through the lens of Fittsʼ three-stage model and Newellʼs constraints-based model, respectively. In essence, both models can be identified, at least in spirit, with ideas about skill described by Bernstein (1967, 1996). Given that the product of "skill acquisition" is the same, although the explanation of the processes might differ, it is perhaps not surprising that similarities between the models appear greater than the differences. In continuing to meet the challenge to explain skill acquisition, neural-based models provide a glimpse of the cutting edge where behavior and biological mechanisms underpinning processes of control, coordination, and acquisition of skill might meet.

The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.

This paper provides a new approach to the evaluation of pre-shipment inspection (PSI) programs as ways of improving tariff-revenue collection and reducing fraud when customs administrations are corrupt. We build a model highlighting the contribution of surveillance firms to the generation of information and describing how incentives for fraud and collusive behaviour between importers and customs are affected by the introduction of PSI. It is shown theoretically that the introduction of PSI has an ambiguous effect on the level of customs fraud. Empirically, our econometric results suggest that PSI reduced fraud in the Philippines; it increased it in Argentina and had not significant impact in Indonesia. JEL classification numbers: F10, F11, F13 Keywords: Trade, Tariff Revenue, Corruption, Pre Shipment Inspection. * This research was produced as part of a World Bank research program on Customs corruption and Pre-Shipment Inpsection services. We are grateful to Nigel Balchin, Caroline Freund, Fred Herren, Francis Ng, Alessandro Nicita, Jerzy Rozanski, Maurice Schiff, Shang-Shin Wei, Luc De Wulf and participants at seminars at the Troisieme Cycle Romand in Crans-Montana and the World Bank for very helpful comments and suggestions. We retain however sole responsibility for any remaining error. The views expressed here are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the institutions to which they are affiliated.† HEC Lausanne;

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