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Successive crises in the European Union have led critics to identify a pervasive tendency to emergency politics, where democratic deliberation gives way to policy decisions forced through by executive authority. By contrast, in this article it is argued that crises may stimulate deliberation and compromise, even when preceded by open conflict and an evident collective action failure. Drawing on a new dataset of 1759 policy-related actions covering the EU and its member states' responses to COVID-19 between March and July 2020, the timing, sequencing and origins of policy claims and steps are traced. Both urgent epidemiological responses are found, where emergency measures were in evidence; and responses to anticipated economic challenges that had to overcome disagreement concerning necessary institutional reforms. The findings depict a multifaceted crisis response. The European Commission acted swiftly but also bought time for member state governments to deliberate. This casts doubt on the many-crises-one-script account of EU emergency politics.

Specific forms of digitised financial innovation have been the subject of several chapters in this volume: Chapter 2 studied the regulation of high-frequency trading and Chapter 3 the role of clearing houses and central depositories in derivatives trading. In this chapter, we examine technological innovation more broadly and in its own right, considering its impact on European regulatory structures in recent years. How does technological innovation, or 'Fintech', 1 in major financial markets-currencies, payment systems, capital markets, alternative intermediaries and insurance-impact upon regulation? The dynamic features of financial markets and the innovation of complex financial products and services based on new technologies and business models present regulators with significant challenges. Specifically, how can they effectively scrutinise unprecedentedly large volumes of market data? Is 'Regtech', an instrument developed by private actors, able to ensure compliance with public regulation? Does an alternative approach which institutionalises public-private cooperation offer answers to new regulatory challenges? New financial technologies and activities often do not fall within the purview of established regulatory regimes, leading to a situation where regulators are playing catch-up with the private sector. At the very least, this necessitates further engagement between public and private actors; at most, it calls for sweeping reforms to regulatory rules and strategies. While it is routine for regulators to encounter asymmetric information problems in interactions with firms (Besanko and Sappington 2001), these are acute in sectors such as finance where disruptive innovation can lead to a state of 'Knightian uncertainty', as was demonstrated by the most recent financial crisis itself (Nelson and Katzenstein 2014). A key lesson drawn from the 2008 crisis was that if

After the subprime financial crisis, the countries who were worst affected set about reforming legacy financial regulations. Given multiple similarities in the way they experienced the crisis and the similar complexions of their post-crisis economies and politics, the contrast between the UK and the Netherlands' approaches to breaking up their largest banks presents a puzzle for prevailing theories in the politics of financial regulation. Both countries explored a range of reform options using similar expert committees, but while UK policymakers determined that commercial and investment operations should be ring-fenced in the largest British banks, the Dutch reform program centered on the banks’ own recommendations to change banking culture from the bottom up by developing a code of conduct and banker's oath. The paper traces this divergence to two related effects produced by the countries’ contrasting majoritarian and consensus party systems: power sharing and coalition formation. Under conditions of high issue salience, both worked to encourage British policymakers to prioritize reform, while in the Netherlands each factor reduced party political responsiveness and de-emphasized alternatives to the banks’ own reform prescriptions. The paper ultimately suggests that institutional democratic variables are worthy of greater recognition among scholars of business power and financial regulation.

Public opinion scholarship suggests that Europeans broadly interpret Brexit as a cautionary fable rather than an encouraging blueprint to follow. Yet, Brexit singularly demonstrates the possibility of European disintegration, and is but one of multiple recent crises that have brought the potential for member state departures into focus. Drawing on new survey data from 16 countries and using logistic regressions, this article charts Europeans’ perceptions of the likelihood future EU exits over the next decade. It finds evidence of asymmetric motivated reasoning: Euroscepticism and pro-Brexit views strongly associate with perceiving exits likely, while among Europhiles this association is only ameliorated, not reversed. This reveals two gaps with repercussions for understanding EU public opinion dynamics. First, between Eurosceptic policy elites’ softened policy stances on exit and their supporters’ steadfast sense that further departures remain likely. Second, between Europhiles’ scepticism of Brexit and a residual lack of confidence in EU cohesion.